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I.?INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused the most severe global 
economic downturn since the Great Depression. 1   The financial 
disruption that triggered the Great Recession began in the United 
States and spread to financial markets around the world, just as the 
financial contagion that began on Wall Street in October 1929 spread 
through foreign markets in the early 1930s.2   
The recent crisis has generated renewed interest in the Glass-
Steagall Banking Act of 1933,3 which Congress adopted in response to 
the collapse of the U.S. banking system and the freezing of U.S. 
capital markets during the Great Depression.4  Glass-Steagall included 
provisions that were designed to stabilize the U.S. financial system by 
separating commercial banks from the capital markets and by 
prohibiting nonbanks from accepting deposits.5  As described in this 
                                                                                                                                             
1 BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS: THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE 
GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES – AND MISUSES – OF HISTORY 1 (2015) 
(describing "the Great Recession of 2008–09 and the Great Depression of 1930–33" 
as "the two great financial crises of our age"); see also Benjamin S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Swearing-In Ceremony Remarks (Feb. 3, 2010), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100203a.htm 
(referring to the financial crisis of 2007–09 as "the deepest financial crisis since the 
Great Depression"). 
2 ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE 
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 168–70, 409–28 (2013) (explaining how the 
global financial crisis of 2008-09 began in America and spread to Europe); 
EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that financial crises began in America 
and spread to Europe during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession).  
3 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (including provisions repealed in 
1999). 
4 See EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 66; see also BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE 
CRASH AND ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1929–1933 (1985) (explaining generally the breakdown of the U.S. banking 
system and capital markets between 1930 and 1933); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did 
Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s Boom-and-Bust 
Cycle of 1921–33? A Preliminary Assessment, 4 CURRENT DEV. IN MONETARY & 
FIN. L. 559, 559–60, 564–68 (2005) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Universal Banks in the 
1920s]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Prelude to Glass-Steagall: Abusive Securities 
Practices by National City Bank and Chase National Bank During the “Roaring 
Twenties”, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1285, 1289, 1301–03, 1322–26 (2016) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Prelude to Glass-Steagall]. 
5 Sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibited commercial banks that were 
members of the Federal Reserve System (member banks) from affiliating with 
securities firms or sharing directors, officers, or employees with securities firms.  
Banking Act of 1933 §§ 20, 32.  Sections 5(c) and 16 of Glass-Steagall barred 
member banks from underwriting or dealing in securities, except for specified 
categories of "bank-eligible" securities, such as U.S. government securities and state 
continued . . . 
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article, a series of rulings by federal agencies and courts during the 
1980s and 1990s undermined Glass-Steagall's structural barriers, and 
Congress repealed the most important provisions of Glass-Steagall in 
1999 by passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).6   
Since the financial crisis, there has been a lively debate on the 
question of whether the removal of Glass-Steagall's structural barriers 
promoted the unsustainable and toxic credit bubble that led to the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  Some authors have argued that Glass-
Steagall's repeal was an important factor that helped to fuel the 
financial crisis, while others have contended that Glass-Steagall's 
disappearance did not contribute to the crisis in any significant way.7  
This article sheds further light on that debate by describing Glass-
Steagall's positive impact on the stability of the U.S. financial system 
from World War II through the 1970s and the adverse consequences of 
Glass-Steagall's disappearance.   
                                                                                                                                             
and local bonds, which were lawful for underwriting or investment by national 
banks.  Banking Act of 1933 §§ 5(c), 16.  Section 21 forbade securities firms and 
other nonbanking firms from accepting deposits.  Banking Act of 1933 § 21.  For 
detailed discussions of these provisions, see DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN 
MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41181, PERMISSIBLE SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF 
COMMERCIAL BANKS UNDER THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT (GSA) AND THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT (GLBA) 5–7 (2010); MELANIE FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF 
BANKS §§ 1.02, 4 (3d ed. 2002). 
6 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
7 For commentaries supporting the view that Glass-Steagall's demise helped to 
promote the toxic credit bubble that triggered the financial crisis, see EICHENGREEN, 
supra note 1, at 8–9, 69–70; Douglas M. Branson, A Return to Old-Time Religion? 
The Glass-Steagall Act, the Volcker Rule, Limits on Proprietary Trading, and 
Sustainability, 11 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L.J. 359, 360–61, 367–69 (2014); Carolyn 
Sissoko, The Plight of Modern Markets: How Universal Banking Undermines 
Capital Markets, 46 ECON. NOTES 53, 58, 88–90 (2017); Martin Mayer, Glass-
Steagall in Our Future: How Straight, How Narrow 5–6 (Networks Fin. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 2009-PB-07, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505488; Yeva 
Nersisyan, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve’s 
Extraordinary Intervention during the Global Financial Crisis 2–4, 8, 21–22 (Levy 
Econ. Inst. Of Bard C., Working Paper No. 829, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554066. Contra Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis – 
A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 UNIV. 
PENN. J. BUS. L 1081, 1082 (2010); Lawrence J. White, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act: A Bridge Too Far? Or Not Far Enough?, 18 SUFFOLK L. REV. 937, 937–38 
(2010); Peter J. Wallison, Did the ‘Repeal’ of Glass-Steagall Have Any Role in the 
Financial Crisis? Not Guilty; Not Even Close 2–3 (Networks Inst. Pub. Policy Brief, 
Working Paper 2009-PB-09, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507803; Paul G. 
Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis 1 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 2957801, 2017), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2957801.  See also Wilmarth, Prelude to Glass-Steagall, 
supra note 4, at 1287–88, 1329 (describing broader public debates about the repeal 
of Glass-Steagall and proposals for its reinstatement). 
? 
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As Part II.A of this article explains, the Glass-Steagall Act and the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)8 helped to maintain the 
stability of the banking industry and capital markets from World War 
II through the 1970s.  Domestic and international developments began 
to challenge the post-New Deal system of financial regulation in the 
1970s, but the structural barriers established by Glass-Steagall and 
BHCA maintained a significant degree of separation between 
commercial banks and other financial sectors until Congress removed 
those barriers in 1999.9  Glass-Steagall and BHCA limited the risks of 
contagion across the banking, securities, and insurance industries, 
thereby helping to ensure that problems arising in one sector would 
not spill over into other sectors.10   
As discussed in Part II.B, large banks and nonbank financial 
institutions opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall and BHCA after 1980 
by persuading federal regulators to approve limited exceptions to their 
structural prohibitions.  During the 1980s and 1990s, federal banking 
agencies and courts adopted creative statutory interpretations that 
enabled banks to engage in capital market activities and allowed 
nonbank financial institutions to offer bank-like products, including 
substitutes for deposits. 11   The collective impact of those rulings 
eroded Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's barriers by permitting 
commercial banks to behave more like securities firms and insurance 
companies, and by allowing nonbank financial institutions to behave 
more like banks.   
Part II.B highlights three of the most significant ways in which 
federal agencies and courts undercut Glass-Steagall and BHCA.  First, 
nonbank financial institutions were allowed to fund their operations by 
offering short-term financial instruments that were redeemable at par 
and served as functional substitutes for deposits.12  Those "shadow 
banking" instruments included money market mutual funds, 
                                                                                                                                             
8 See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–52 (2012). 
9 Branson, supra note 7, at 368. 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.B. 
12 See EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 66–68; ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD 
BANKS DO? 34–35 (1987); JEFF MADRICK, THE AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF 
FINANCE AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 97–98 (2011); 
Timothy Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds and Other 
Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156–59, 
164–67 (Timothy Q. Cook and Robert K. LaRoche eds., 7th ed. 1993) (discussing 
emergence and regulation of MMMFs); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, AUTHORIZED EDITION: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 29–30, 33 (2011) [hereinafter FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N 
(2011)]. 
? ??? ???????????????
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commercial paper, and securities repurchase agreements (repos). 13  
The largest commercial banks also began to rely significantly on 
"shadow bank deposits" after they were allowed to establish securities 
affiliates beginning in 1987.14   
Second, banks received permission to convert their consumer and 
commercial loans into asset-backed securities through the process of 
securitization.15  Third, banks gained authority to become dealers in 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, which provided synthetic 
substitutes for securities, exchange-traded options and futures, and 
insurance.16   Shadow banking, securitization, and OTC derivatives 
helped to weaken Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's walls, which formerly 
separated banks from the securities and insurance industries.  In 
addition, all three innovations were leading catalysts for the 
destructive credit bubble that led to the financial crisis of 2007-2009.17   
As described in Part III, big banks were not satisfied with the 
limited victories they achieved by opening loopholes in Glass-Steagall 
and BHCA.  The big-bank lobby and its allies launched a prolonged 
campaign in the 1980s and 1990s to repeal Glass-Steagall's and 
BHCA's provisions that restricted banks from expanding across state 
lines and prevented banks from establishing full-scale affiliations with 
securities firms and insurance companies. 18   In 1991, the U.S. 
Treasury Department issued a landmark report, which called for the 
removal of state-law restrictions on interstate banking and branching 
as well as the repeal of Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation 
rules.19  Congress adopted Treasury's plan for nationwide banking and 
branching by enacting the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (Riegle-Neal) in 1994.20  Ambitious bank 
executives quickly created giant megabanks, which were eager to 
                                                                                                                                             
13 See infra Part II.B.1. 
14 See infra notes 133, 136–37 and accompanying text.  
15 See infra Part II.B.2. 
16 Russell J. Funk & Daniel Hirschman, Derivatives and Deregulation: 
Financial Innovation and the Demise of Glass-Steagall, 59 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 669, 
697 (2014); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit 
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
17 See infra notes 129–44, 242–56, 343–65 and accompanying text. 
18 EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 69–70; Sissoko, supra note 7, at 76; White, 
supra note 7, at 941; Robert Scheer, Privacy Issue Bubbles Beneath the Photo Op, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at B9; see infra Part III.A. 
19 See generally U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS, 49–61 
(1991) (recommending legislation authorizing interstate banking and repealing the 
anti-affiliation rules of Glass-Steagall and BHCA). 
20 See generally Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). 
? 
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expand their activities in the securities and insurance sectors. 21  
Securities firms and insurance companies abandoned their 
longstanding defense of Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural 
barriers after they realized that they could no longer counteract the 
growing political influence of the largest banks. 22   However, 
community banks and independent insurance agents continued to 
block efforts by the largest financial institutions to remove those 
barriers between 1995 and 1997.23   
In 1998, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) placed great pressure on 
Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation rules 
by approving a merger between Travelers, a large insurance and 
securities conglomerate, and Citicorp, the largest U.S. bank.24  That 
merger created Citigroup, the first "universal bank" to operate in the 
United States since the 1930s. 25   President Bill Clinton, Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin, and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan endorsed 
the creation of Citigroup, even though it was contrary to the clear 
intent of Glass-Steagall and BHCA.26   
Citigroup and other large financial institutions spearheaded a 
massive lobbying campaign that finally persuaded Congress to adopt 
GLBA in 1999.27  GLBA authorized the creation of financial holding 
companies that could own banks, securities firms, and insurance 
companies, thereby confirming the validity of Citigroup's universal 
banking strategy.28  As I argued in an article published in 2002, GLBA 
made the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF) problem "much worse" by 
                                                                                                                                             
21 See infra notes 510–18, 536–37 and accompanying text. 
22 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and 
Regulatory Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 73–75 (2002) [hereinafter Wilmarth, 
Citigroup]; see also infra notes 541–43 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 539–40 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 544–57 and accompanying text.  
25 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 215, 220 (2002) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Transformation].  As used in this 
article, the term "universal bank" means a banking organization that can engage, 
either directly or through affiliates, in a broad array of banking, securities, and 
insurance activities.  Unless otherwise indicated, the term "bank" includes both 
chartered banks and bank holding companies (including their subsidiaries and 
affiliates).  Id. at 223 n.23. 
26 See infra notes 550–59 and accompanying text. 
27 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(1999) (codified in scattered versions of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see infra notes 562, 580–
82 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying campaign that led to the passage 
of GLBA). 
28 GLBA § 101, 113 Stat. 1341 (repealing §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall); 
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 219–21, 306–07 (describing the impact 
of GLBA). 
? ??? ???????????????
????? ??????????????????
?????????
expanding the scope of the federal "safety net" for banks to cover "the 
entire financial services industry."29    
The twenty-year campaign by big banks to destroy the barriers that 
separated them from the capital markets culminated in Congress' 
enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 
2000. 30   CFMA authorized large financial institutions to offer a 
complex array of OTC derivatives without any substantive regulation 
by federal or state authorities.31  GLBA and CFMA both ratified and 
significantly expanded the deregulatory measures that federal 
authorities had implemented on an incremental, piecemeal basis 
during the 1980s and 1990s.32  By providing legal certainty for those 
measures and expanding their scope, Congress validated a new regime 
of regulatory laxity that enabled giant financial conglomerates to 
operate with relatively few constraints.  Those financial conglomerates 
led the way in financing the toxic credit boom that triggered the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.33   
This article contends that Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA were 
highly consequential laws because they (i) allowed large banks to 
become much bigger and more complex, and to undertake a much 
wider array of high-risk activities, (ii) permitted securities firms and 
insurance companies to offer bank-like products (including deposit 
substitutes), and (iii) provided a blueprint for light-tough supervision 
of large financial institutions.34  All of those factors helped to fuel the 
                                                                                                                                             
29 See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 444–51, 474–75; see also 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV 
963, 1049–50 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking].  At 
the time of the financial crisis, the federal "safety net" for banks consisted of federal 
deposit insurance, the Fed's role as "lender of last resort" in providing emergency 
loans to troubled banks through its discount window, and the Fed's guarantee of 
interbank payments made on Fedwire.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the 
Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1588 n.284 (2007) 
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce]. 
30 Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000); see infra notes 746–56 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of 
CFMA). 
31 Letter from Lynn A. Stout, Professor, Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, to 
Comm. on Agric., Forestry, and Nutrition 1, 2 (June 4, 2009), available at 
https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/testimony_stout.pdf; see infra 
notes 750–52 and accompanying text (describing the impact of CFMA).  
32 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving 
in to Wall Street, 81 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1360 (2013) [hereinafter Wilmarth, 
Turning a Blind Eye]; see infra Parts III.C and III.D. 
33 Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 968–72, 1002–
50.  
34 EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 69–73; see infra Part IV (discussing the 
continued . . . 
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destructive credit boom of the early 2000s.  Accordingly, I disagree 
with commentators who argue that those laws did not have any 
significant connection to the financial crisis.   
As discussed in the Conclusion, this article does not include 
detailed recommendations for proposed reforms to address the 
problems created by Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA.  I have 
discussed possible reforms in previous work, and I plan to develop a 
more detailed set of potential reforms in future work.  At a minimum, 
as the Conclusion indicates, those reforms should (i) shrink the 
shadow banking system by prohibiting nonbanks from offering deposit 
substitutes, and (ii) establish a regime of strict separation between 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured banks and the 
capital markets.  The second reform should include a prohibition that 
bars FDIC-insured banks from entering into derivatives except for 
those that create bona fide hedges against risk exposures arising out of 
traditional banking activities.   
II.?GLASS-STEAGALL AND BHCA HELPED TO MAINTAIN POSTWAR 
FINANCIAL STABILITY BUT WERE UNDERMINED BY THE FINANCIAL 
INDUSTRY AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 
 
Glass-Steagall and BHCA contributed to the stability of the 
financial system after World War II.35  However, large U.S. banks 
resented the restrictions imposed on them by Glass-Steagall's and 
BHCA's structural barriers.36  During the 1980s and 1990s, federal 
regulators opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall and BHCA by allowing 
banks and nonbank financial institutions to create short-term 
nondeposit liabilities, to engage in securitization, and to develop OTC 
derivatives.37  In combination, those regulatory loopholes helped to 
undermine the post-New Deal system of financial regulation.38   
A.? The Structural Barriers Established by Glass-Steagall and 
BHCA Helped to Preserve Financial Stability by Preventing 
Contagious Spillovers of Risks and Losses among the Banking, 
Securities, and Insurance Sectors 
 
In adopting the Glass-Steagall Act and other Depression-era 
statutes, Congress sought to prevent a recurrence of the Great 
                                                                                                                                             
collective impact of Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA). 
35 See infra Part II.A. 
36 See infra Part III.A. 
37 Markham, supra note 7, at 1095–1103; White, supra note 7, at 940–41. 
38 See infra Part II.B.  
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Depression by establishing a stable financial system comprised of 
separate and compartmentalized financial markets.39  Congress barred 
banks from participating in speculative activities in the capital 
markets, and Congress required banks to focus on their traditional 
roles of accepting deposits, making loans to consumers and 
businesses, providing fiduciary services, and investing in low-risk 
government securities.40  To deter banks from pursuing nontraditional 
banking activities, the Glass-Steagall Act barred the Fed from making 
loans to banks through its discount window if those loans would 
enable banks to finance speculative activities in the capital markets.41  
At the same time, Congress prohibited nonbanks from accepting 
deposits, to prevent nonbanks from engaging in the banking 
business.42  Congress wanted to ensure that the Fed would not be 
forced "to rescue speculators to save depositors."43   
Congress took further steps to bolster the stability of the banking 
system.  First, Congress established a system of federal deposit 
insurance to discourage destructive "runs" by depositors on banks.44  
Second, Congress tried to stop what it viewed as destructive 
competition between banks.45  To accomplish that goal, the Glass-
Steagall Act prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits 
(checking accounts) and required the Fed to adopt a rule (Regulation 
Q) that would limit the interest rates banks could pay on their 
certificates of deposit, savings accounts, and other time deposits.46  
                                                                                                                                             
39 Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1564–65; 
Wilmarth, Universal Banks in the 1920s, supra note 4, at 564–68, 588–91, 611. 
40 LITAN, supra note 12, at 25–35; See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 
25, at 225–30, 254–57; see also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 1 
(discussing Glass-Steagall's provisions that separated banks from capital markets 
activities). 
41 Banking Act of 1933, §§ 3(a), 9, 11(a), 48 Stat. 163, 180–81 (1933); 
Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems, S. REP. NO. 73-77, 
at 9, 15, 17 (1933).  Section 11(a) of the statute barred member banks from 
encouraging speculation in securities by acting as "the medium or agent" for loans 
made by nonbank firms to securities brokers or dealers backed by stocks, bonds, or 
"other investment securities."  48 Stat. 181. 
42 See Banking Act of 1933 § 21, 48 Stat. 189. 
43 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY 
AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 374–75 (1990). 
44 Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat. 168; S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 11–12, 14 
(1933); see also RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21 (5th ed. 2017) (stating that federal deposit insurance 
"proved remarkably successful at preventing runs" on FDIC-insured banks). 
45 Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73–66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 181; S. REP. NO. 73–
77, at 15; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 29. 
46 Id.; see also MADRICK, supra note 12, at 13 ("The fear was that competition 
for deposits would drive rates up and encourage banks to make risky investments to 
continued . . . 
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Congress also maintained limits on geographic expansion by banks, as 
Congress allowed national banks to establish branches only within 
their home state and only to the extent that branching was permissible 
for state banks under state law.47   
In 1956, Congress enacted the BHCA to reinforce Glass-Steagall's 
policy of maintaining separate and decentralized financial markets.48  
The BHCA was enacted in response to the rapid growth and 
diversification of Transamerica and other large bank holding 
companies after World War II.49  By 1956, Transamerica "controlled 
banks in ten states as well as several insurance companies and 
commercial businesses engaged in oil and gas development, fish 
canning and processing, frozen foods, and a variety of manufacturing 
ventures."50   
BHCA required holding companies to obtain the Fed's approval 
before they acquired banks. 51   BHCA also authorized the Fed to 
regulate the activities of bank holding companies.52  The statute barred 
bank holding companies from engaging in industrial and commercial 
activities.53  Under Section 3(d) of BHCA, bank holding companies 
could not acquire banks across state lines unless such transactions 
were specifically authorized by the laws of the states in which the 
acquired banks were located.54  The states did not begin to pass such 
laws until 1975.55   
Section 4 of BHCA allowed bank holding companies, with the 
Fed's permission, to own nonbank subsidiaries whose activities were 
"closely related" to banking.56  With limited exceptions, Section 4 
prohibited bank holding companies from owning subsidiaries that 
engaged in most types of insurance activities or that conducted 
commercial or industrial operations. 57   Section 4 also prevented 
insurance, commercial, and industrial companies from owning 
                                                                                                                                             
earn higher returns" unless Congress imposed restrictions on deposit interest rates).  
47 Banking Act of 1933 § 23; S. REP. NO. 73–77, at 11, 16–17 (1933); Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide 
Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 973-75 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail].  
48 Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566. 
49 Id. at 1566–67. 
50 Id. 
51 See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012). 
52 Id. §§ 1842–44. 
53 12 U.S.C. § 1843. 
54 See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 975–76; Wilmarth, 
Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–67 (discussing 
BHCA's enactment in 1956).  
55 Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 977. 
56 Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1567. 
57 12 U.S.C. § 1843.  
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banks. 58   Thus, BHCA represented "a powerful statement of 
Congress's intention to separate banking and commerce."59   
 
 ********************************************* 
  
Under the financial system established by Glass-Steagall and 
BHCA, "banks accepted deposits and extended loans to businesses and 
consumers," while "securities firms accessed 'at risk' funds of long-
term investors to meet the capital needs of commercial and industrial 
firms," and "the insurance industry collected premiums to underwrite 
business and individual risks, allocating the funds received to the 
capital markets."60  The U.S. financial system of 1960 ensured that 
regulated depository institutions were the primary repositories for 
household savings and short-term funds held by business firms, while 
securities firms relied on longer-term commitments of invested funds 
and insurance companies financed their operations with longer-term 
streams of premium payments.61  This system of "segmented" markets 
"generally prospered well into the 1970s."62   
During the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts defended the post-New 
Deal financial system and struck down attempts by federal bank 
regulators to evade Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural barriers.63  
The courts overruled a series of rulings issued by Comptroller of the 
Currency James Saxon between 1961 and 1966, which attempted to 
expand the securities and insurance powers of national banks. 64  
                                                                                                                                             
58 Id. 
59 Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–67 
(explaining that, while the original BHCA applied only to holding companies that 
controlled two or more banks, in 1970 Congress expanded BHCA's scope to reach 
one-bank holding companies). 
60 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991), at XVIII-9. 
61 Id. at XVIII-6 through XVIII-9. 
62 Id.; see also EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that the United States 
enjoyed a "golden age of financial stability . . . [b]etween the end of World War II 
and the 1970s").  
63 See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (striking down a 
regulation authorizing national banks to establish and operate collective investment 
funds); see also Saxon v. Ga. Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1020 (5th 
Cir. 1968) (invalidating a ruling that allowed national banks to operate insurance 
agencies across the nation); see also Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 
F.2d 497, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (overruling a regulation that permitted national banks 
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds). 
64 See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst., 401 U.S. at 617; see also Saxon, 399 F.2d at 1010; see 
also Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d at 497; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of 
State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual 
Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1157–58 (1990) [hereinafter Wilmarth, 
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Similarly, the courts and Congress prevented the Fed from enlarging 
the permissible insurance activities of bank holding companies during 
the 1970s and early 1980s.65   
As discussed below in Part II.B., the stable postwar financial 
system established by Glass-Steagall and BHCA experienced a series 
of economic shocks and legal challenges after 1970.66  However, the 
anti-affiliation provisions of both statutes maintained a significant 
degree of separation between commercial banks and securities firms 
and insurance companies until GLBA repealed those provisions in 
1999. 67   After Congress removed Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's 
structural barriers, large financial conglomerates grew rapidly in size 
and in scope, and their activities became more complex, opaque, and 
risky.68  Large financial conglomerates were the dominant players in 
the U.S. financial industry by the early 2000s, and the systemic risk 
they generated steadily increased until it reached critical levels in 
2007, on the eve of the financial crisis.69   
In an article published in 2002, I argued that Glass-Steagall and 
BHCA significantly reduced systemic risk in U.S. financial markets by 
separating the banking sector from the securities and insurance 
sectors.70  As a result of that separation, risks and losses in one sector 
were less likely to spill over into other sectors, and financial 
institutions in one sector could support other sectors that were under 
stress.71  Major banks (with support from the Fed's discount window) 
provided emergency credit to the commercial paper market following 
Penn Central's default in 1970, to securities broker-dealers after the 
stock market crash of 1987, and to corporate borrowers after Russia's 
debt default in 1998.72  During each of those disruptions, major banks 
did not suffer crippling losses in the capital markets (although losses 
incurred by several large banks in 1998 revealed that those banks were 
increasing their exposure to securities activities). 73   Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                             
State Bank Powers]. 
65 See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 226–27. 
66 See infra notes 88–98 and accompanying text. 
67 Wilmarth, Separation of Banking and Commerce, supra note 29, at 1566–73, 
1580–81. 
68 See Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 972–97; 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response 
to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 963–75 (2011) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response]. 
69 Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 29, at 1002–50; 
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 963–82. 
70 See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 444, 451. 
71 See id. at 235–37, 444, 451. 
72 See id. at 235–37. 
73 Id. at 235–37, 375–77. 
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banks could serve as a "backup source of liquidity" for other sectors of 
the financial industry and nonfinancial corporations. 74   Similarly, 
securities firms were able to serve as an alternative source of credit for 
nonfinancial businesses when large banks suffered serious losses from 
nonperforming loans during the early 1990s.75   
In the same 2002 article, I contended that "the greatest danger" of 
GLBA was that it would increase "the concentration of credit risk and 
market risk within the U.S. financial system" by removing the 
"alternative financial channels . . . that acted as 'shock absorbers' for 
the U.S. economy" prior to the removal of Glass-Steagall's and 
BHCA's structural barriers.76  I also warned that GLBA would "extend 
the scope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of large 
financial holding companies," because federal regulators would be 
"likely to conclude that they should protect nonbank affiliates of big 
financial conglomerates during economic disruptions in order to 
reduce systemic risk."77  After GLBA, I argued, it was highly probable 
that "major segments of the securities and life insurance industry will 
be brought within the scope of the TBTF doctrine, thereby expanding 
the scope and cost of federal 'safety net' guarantees."78  The financial 
crisis of 2007-09 exceeded my worst expectations.   
In September 1999 – just two months before Congress repealed 
Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation rules – Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan boasted that the U.S. financial industry had a "spare 
tire" that successfully maintained the stability of financial markets 
during the crises of 1990 and 1998.79  As Greenspan noted, securities 
firms "were able to substitute for the loss of bank financial 
                                                                                                                                             
74 Id. at 235–37, 451.  For additional discussions of how the Fed mobilized the 
banking system to provide emergency liquidity support to the capital markets during 
the commercial paper crisis of 1970 and the stock market crash of 1987, see 
CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 700–01; E. P. DAVIS, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND 
SYSTEMIC RISK, 161–63, 250–51 (1992); FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 98–104 (1991); 
Andrew F. Brimmer, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central 
Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5–7, 11–15 
(1989); see also infra note 452 and accompanying text (explaining that the stock 
market crash in October 1987 did not have a contagious impact on the banking 
industry due to the structural insulation provided by the Glass-Steagall Act). 
75 Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 25, at 451. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 446–47. 
78 Id. at 447. 
79 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks by Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan Before the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund, 
Program of Seminars (Sept. 27, 1999); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), 
supra note 12, at 56–58 (discussing Greenspan’s “spare tire” speech). 
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intermediation" when "American banks seized up in 1990." 80  
Conversely, when "public capital markets in United States virtually 
seized up" during the Russian default crisis of 1998, commercial banks 
"replaced the intermediation function of the public capital markets."81   
It was highly ironic that Greenspan gave his "spare tire" speech at 
a time when he was strongly urging Congress to enact GLBA and 
thereby destroy the structural separations established by Glass-Steagall 
and BHCA.  GLBA removed the "spare tire" lauded by Greenspan and 
facilitated the emergence of giant financial conglomerates.82  Those 
conglomerates exposed the U.S. economy to devastating spillovers of 
risks and losses between the banking industry and the securities and 
insurance sectors.  It is hardly a coincidence that the financial crisis of 
2007–2009 was triggered by failures or threatened collapses of leading 
firms within all three sectors.83   
In 2012, economist Luigi Zingales announced his support for a 
restoration of Glass-Steagall's structural barriers, in part because a 
separation of banks from the capital markets would "make the 
financial system more resilient."84  He noted the evident benefits of 
Glass-Steagall during the 1987 stock market crash and the 1990-91 
banking crisis.85  In contrast, after Glass-Steagall was repealed, "in 
2008 the banking crisis and the stock market crisis infected each other, 
pulling down the entire economy."86   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
80 Speech by Alan Greenspan, supra note 79. 
81 Id. 
82 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 957–59, 
963–67, 970–77. 
83 Id. 
84 Luigi Zingales, Why I Was Won Over by Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES (June 10, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb3e52be-b08d-11e1-8b36-
00144feabdc0.html.  
85 Id.  
86 See id.  In a March 2010 interview, former Citigroup co-chairman John Reed 
observed that "the compartmentalization that was created by Glass-Steagall would be 
a positive factor" because it would reduce the risks of "a catastrophic failure" 
affecting the entire financial system.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), 
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that Congress made a serious mistake in enacting GLBA and repealing Glass-
Steagall); Reed left Citigroup in April 2000, after Sandy Weill convinced Citigroup's 
board to put Weill in charge.  MADRICK, supra note 12, at 314–15. 
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B.? The Financial Industry and Federal Authorities Used Three 
Principal Strategies to Undermine the Separation of the 
Banking Industry from the Securities and Insurance Industries 
1.? The Demise of Regulation Q, the Creation of Deposit 
Substitutes by Nonbanks, and the Rise of Shadow Banking 
 
The interest rate ceilings on bank deposits established by 
Regulation Q were the first major component of Glass-Steagall to 
fall.87  Regulation Q's interest rate limits became unviable during an 
extended period of high and volatile interest rates that lasted from the 
late 1960s until the early 1980s.88  Inflationary pressures began to 
develop during the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Johnson and 
Nixon Administrations ran large federal budget deficits to finance 
ambitious domestic spending programs as well as higher military 
expenditures for the Vietnam War.89  Deficits and trade imbalances 
weakened the dollar and forced President Nixon to suspend the 
convertibility of dollars into gold in August 1971.90  Nixon's action led 
to the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of relatively stable 
international currency exchange rates.91  The demise of Bretton Woods 
resulted in much higher volatility for interest and currency exchange 
rates.92   
The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum 
                                                                                                                                             
87 Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87 FED. RES. BANK ST. 
LOUIS REV. 145, 158–72 (March/April 2005), 
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/05/03/part2/MarchApril2
005Part2.pdf?? 
88 Id.  
89 Id.; ROBERT L. HETZEL, THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE: 
A HISTORY, 67–93 (2008)? 
90 See Michael D. Bordo, The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods 
System, 1958 to 1971 24 (Hoover Inst. Working Paper No. 23189, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23189. 
91 See id.  Under the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, the United States 
promised to convert dollars into gold at a fixed price of thirty-five dollars per ounce, 
and many other nations agreed to peg their currencies to the dollar.  Id. at 3.  The 
Bretton Woods System permitted member nations to adjust their exchange rates 
under the oversight of the International Monetary Fund.  Id. at 3.  Nixon's suspension 
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countries adopted floating exchange rates.  See id. at 26.  See also HETZEL, supra 
note 89, at 100–07 (discussing the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system); 
WILLIAM L. SILBER, VOLCKER: THE TRIUMPH OF PERSISTENCE 23–26, 86–92, 113–
21 (2012) (same).  
92 See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF 
RISK 246, 251, 320–22 (1996); HETZEL, supra note 89, at 150–54.  
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Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 caused a dramatic increase in oil 
prices,93 and the Iranian revolution of 1979 triggered a second spike in 
oil prices.94  Rising oil prices helped to push U.S. inflation rates to all-
time highs by 1980. 95   Under the leadership of Chairman Paul 
Volcker, the Fed adopted an aggressive anti-inflation policy and hiked 
short-term interest rates to unprecedented levels.96  The federal funds 
rate rose to twenty percent in early 1981 and remained as high as 
fourteen percent in 1982.97   
As short-term interest rates rose far above the interest rate ceilings 
established by Regulation Q, depositors withdrew their funds from 
bank accounts and sought higher-yielding investments.98  Large banks 
looked for ways to offer higher-yielding deposits while avoiding 
Regulation Q. 99   Beginning in the 1960s, under Walter Wriston's 
leadership, Citibank issued negotiable-rate, large-denomination 
certificates of deposit (CDs) through its domestic branches and also 
accepted Eurodollar deposits through Citibank's overseas branches.100  
Both types of deposits paid interest rates higher than those permitted 
                                                                                                                                             
93 Greg Myre, The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo: The Old Rules No Longer Apply, 
NPR (Oct. 16, 2013, 12:15 PM), 
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94 See Laurel Graefe, Oil Shock of 1978-79, FED. RESERVE HIST. (Nov. 22, 
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95 R.A., Who Beat Inflation?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/03/volcker_recession.  
96 See id. 
97 Business Desk, What Led to the High Interest Rates of the 1980s?, PBS (May 
29, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/what-led-to-the-
high-interest/; MADRICK, supra note 12, at 165–66, 169–70.  See also SILBER, supra 
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98 MADRICK, supra note 12, at 18, 22, 97–98.  
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 17–19. HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THOMAS F. HUERTAS, 
CITIBANK, 1812–1970 253–57 (1985).  Wriston's bank will be referred to as 
"Citibank" in this article, but the bank operated under the name of "First National 
City Bank of New York" from 1962 to 1976, when its name was changed to 
"Citibank."  Id.  In the early 1960s, Wriston arranged for Citibank to make a $10 
million loan to the Discount Corporation of New York, a government bond dealer 
(Discount), in order to persuade Discount to create a secondary market for investors 
who wanted to trade in Citibank's negotiable CDs.  MADRICK, supra note 12, at 17.  
Citibank's loan to Discount created a situation where Citibank was effectively 
"making its own markets for the CDs they issued, taking a substantial risk and 
violating the spirit and perhaps even the letter of New Deal regulations that 
prevented conflicts of interest."  Id.  However, with "the Federal Reserve looking the 
other way," Citibank's negotiable CDs were very successful, and other major U.S. 
banks soon followed Citibank's example.  Id. at 17–18. 
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by Regulation Q.  Although Citibank acted without advance approval 
from the Fed, the Fed acquiesced in Citibank's circumvention of 
Regulation Q, and other large banks soon followed Citibank's 
example.101 
In the early 1970s, the securities industry introduced its own 
innovative financial instrument, the money market mutual fund 
(MMMF). 102   MMMFs were short-term investment vehicles that 
offered deposit-like features and were not subject to the interest-rate 
limits of Regulation Q.103  MMMFs allowed investors to withdraw 
their funds based on a fixed net asset value (NAV) equal to the 
original purchase price of one dollar per share.104  MMMFs were not 
federally insured like bank deposits, but they offered investors the 
ability to withdraw their funds on demand at par, were regulated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and were required to 
invest in "safe" short-term securities, such as U.S. Treasury bonds and 
highly-rated commercial paper.105  Investors generally believed that 
the institutional sponsors of MMMFs would provide financial backing 
to prevent their funds from breaking the buck.106   
In 1977, Merrill Lynch, a leading securities broker-dealer, created 
the "cash management account" (CMA), which allowed holders to 
write checks against their funds held in Merrill Lynch's MMMFs.107  
Other securities broker-dealers quickly added check-writing features 
to their own MMMFs.108  MMMFs were exempt from Regulation Q 
because they were classified and regulated as mutual funds (equity 
investments) rather than "deposits."109  As a result, MMMFs offered 
customers many of the functional attributes of deposits, including 
redemption at par on demand and check-writing, along with much 
higher yields on their invested funds.110  Institutions and individuals 
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rapidly shifted their short-term funds from bank deposits to MMMFs, 
and the total volume of MMMFs mushroomed from $3 billion in 1977 
to $235 billion in 1982.111   
As Morgan Ricks pointed out, the emergence of MMMFs 
"represented a deliberate end-run around the U.S. deposit banking 
system," an evasion that the SEC "abetted" through its decision to 
exempt MMMFs from many of the regulations governing mutual 
funds.112  The most important exemption allowed MMMFs to redeem 
their shares based on a "stable" NAV of one dollar per share, instead 
of following the general rule that mutual funds must redeem their 
shares based on “current market value.”113  The “stable” NAV, which 
permitted redemption at par, was crucial to the success of MMMFs 
because MMMFs “want[ed] investors to view shares in an MMF as 
close substitutes for savings and time deposits at commercial banks 
and other depository institutions.”114   
Morris Crawford, chairman of the Bowery Savings Bank in New 
York City, sent letters to the U.S. Attorney General and the SEC in 
October 1979, alleging that MMMFs with check-writing privileges 
were illegal deposits prohibited by Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall 
Act.115  The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) rejected Crawford's 
claims and concluded that an investor in an MMMF was not a 
"depositor."116  In the DOJ's view, an investor in an MMMF owned an 
equity interest with "the potential for capital gain or loss on his 
investment."117  The DOJ also determined that an investor's ability to 
"transfer his ownership" in an MMMF to other parties by writing 
checks was "a mere formality and serves in no way to alter the 
substance of his status as owner." 118   The DOJ's rejection of 
Crawford's claims ignored the practical reality that MMMFs with 
CMA features offered services that were functional substitutes for 
                                                                                                                                             
111 See id. at 29–30; Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 157. 
112 MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 233 (2016). 
113 See Cook & Duffield, supra note 12, at 164–65. 
114 Id. 
115 Letter from Philip E. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ’s 
Criminal Division, and Lawrence Lippe, Chief of the Criminal Division’s General 
Litigation and Legal Advice Section, to Martin Lybecker, Associate Director for the 
SEC’s Division of Marketing Management (Undated letter evidently sent in 
December 1979) (rejecting claims made in letters sent to the SEC and the Attorney 
General in October 1979 by Morris D. Crawford, Jr., Chairman of the Board of the 
Bowery Savings Bank of New York) (photocopy on file with the author).  I am 
indebted to Morgan Ricks for providing the photocopy of the letter to me. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
? ??? ???????????????
????? ??????????????????
?????????
checking accounts.  The significant advantages of MMMFs induced 
many customers to transfer their savings from bank accounts into 
higher-yielding MMMFs, and the total volume of MMMFs reached 
$235 billion in November 1982.119   
 
 ******************************************** 
   
Fed chairman Paul Volcker's war on inflation between 1979 and 
1983 made Regulation Q's interest-rate ceilings untenable for banks 
and savings and loan associations (thrifts).120  The rapid growth of 
MMMFs (which federal regulators did not try to stop) provided a 
convenient rationale for abolishing Regulation Q.  Congress passed 
statutes in 1980 and 1982 that phased out Regulation Q and permitted 
banks and thrifts to offer deposit accounts with market-based yields 
that could compete with MMMFs.121  However, MMMFs did not have 
to bear the costs of complying with banking regulations, and they 
generally offered higher returns than bank deposits.  As a result, the 
outstanding volume of MMMFs continued to grow, rising from $235 
billion in 1982 to $740 billion in 1995, $1.8 trillion in 2000, and $3.8 
trillion in 2007.122   
The expansion of MMMFs encouraged the growth of the shadow 
banking system – a system in which securities broker-dealers, finance 
companies, and other nonbanks obtained funds on a short-term basis 
from investors and used those funds to provide longer-term loans to 
consumers and businesses.123  Securities firms established MMMFs to 
attract large amounts of short-term funding from retail and 
institutional customers.  MMMFs were leading investors in 
commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements (repos), which 
became two of the most important short-term funding vehicles for the 
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COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30, 33; Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Credit Supply 
Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis 20 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Working Paper No. 15-5, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687395. 
123 See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (July 
2010), at 11–20, 33–46, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645337. 
? 
????? ??????????????????? ????
shadow banking system.124  Commercial paper is a short-term debt 
security that typically has a maturity of less than ninety days.125  A 
repo is a short-term, secured lending arrangement in which the lender 
provides a cash loan and the borrower provides collateral in the form 
of securities acceptable to the lender.126  The amount of the repo loan 
equals the market value of the collateral minus a “haircut” reflecting 
the perceived riskiness of the collateral.127  Upon the expiration of a 
repo’s term (typically one day or a few days), the parties either renew 
(“roll over”) the loan or the lender returns the collateral to the 
borrower and the borrower repays the cash loan with accrued 
interest.128   
As MMMFs grew, so did the commercial paper and repo markets.  
The volume of outstanding commercial paper increased from less than 
$50 billion in 1975 to $560 billion in 1990, $1.3 trillion in 2000, and 
$2 trillion in 2007.129   The volume of repos entered into by large 
securities broker-dealers rose from $110 billion in 1981 to $800 billion 
in 1990, $2.5 trillion in 2002, and $3.5 trillion in 2007.130  During that 
period, MMMFs were the largest purchasers of commercial paper and 
among the most important cash lenders for repos.131  Funding provided 
by MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos enabled securities firms and 
other nonbanks to compete with banks in providing credit to 
                                                                                                                                             
124 See Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 46–52; Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp 
Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30–31 (2010). 
125 See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 38; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 30.   
126 Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, 73 
FED. RESERVE BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. 15, 15–17 (1987). 
127 Id. at 17. 
128 BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 241–42 (2010); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N 
(2011), supra note 12, at 31.  The repo market consists of two major segments: 
triparty repos, in which a clearing bank manages the transaction as agent for both the 
lender and the borrower, and bilateral repos, in which the lender and the borrower 
deal with each other directly.  Viktoria Baklanova et al., Reference Guide to U.S. 
Repo and Securities Lending Markets 8–13 (Office of Fin. Research, Working Paper 
No. 15-17, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664207. 
129 See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 30–32, 38. 
130 Lumpkin, supra note 126, at 73–74; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 122, at 
19; Michael Fleming & Kenneth Garbade, The Repurchase Agreement Refined: GCF 
Repo, 9 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. 1, 1–7 (2003). 
131 MMMFs owned about one-third of the outstanding commercial paper in both 
1992 and 2007.  Thomas Hahn, Commercial Paper, 79 FED. RESERVE BANK 
RICHMOND 45, 50–51 (1993); see Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 35.  
MMMFs were also among the most significant cash lenders for repos.  Pozsar et al., 
supra note 125, at 50–52. 
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consumers and businesses through the process of securitization. 132  
After regulators allowed banks to establish their own securities 
affiliates and to engage in securitization, large banking organizations 
became active participants in the shadow banking system.133   
 
       ******************************************** 
 
The high inflation rates that led to the demise of Regulation Q did 
not compel policymakers to allow nonbanks to offer deposit 
substitutes and thereby create the shadow banking system.  Congress 
and federal regulators could have removed or relaxed Regulation Q's 
interest-rate ceilings for bank deposits — thereby permitting fairer 
returns to savers — while enforcing Glass-Steagall's prohibition 
against the acceptance of deposits by nonbanks.  As Morgan Ricks has 
recommended, federal regulators could have barred securities firms 
and other nonbanks from issuing deposit substitutes like MMMFs, 
short-term commercial paper, and repos.134  However, regulators never 
chose the available option of prohibiting deposit substitutes and 
requiring nonbanks to fund their activities in a more stable and 
transparent manner by issuing stock and longer-term debt securities, or 
by entering into term loans with banks.135   
After the largest banks obtained regulatory permission to establish 
securities subsidiaries, beginning in 1987, those banks also increased 
their reliance on deposit substitutes in the shadow banking system.136  
Major banks and leading Wall Street securities firms brought in huge 
volumes of short-term funding by (i) selling commercial paper to 
MMMFs and to off-balance-sheet securitization conduits, and (ii) 
                                                                                                                                             
132 Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 33–46 (explaining how securities broker-
dealers, finance companies and other nonbanks relied on short-term funding 
provided by MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos to originate or purchase longer-
term consumer and business loans, including residential and commercial mortgages). 
133 Id. at 22–33. 
134 RICKS, supra note 112, at 5–6, 226, 230–37, 301. 
135 The check-writing privileges offered by Merrill Lynch's MMMFs with CMA 
features depended on Merrill Lynch's ability to employ a large regional bank (Banc 
One) to clear CMA checks through the banking industry's check-clearing system, 
which the Fed regulated.  Mayer, supra note 7, at 10.  Thus, the Fed could have 
blocked MMMFs with check-writing privileges by instructing banks not to clear 
their checks.  In a 1981 interview, the noted financial journalist Martin Mayer asked 
Paul Volcker why the Fed allowed Merrill Lynch to offer MMMFs that functioned 
as substitutes for checkable deposits.  Id.  According to Mayer, Volcker replied, "It 
was one of those things where you look and think, 'That's interesting, I wonder 
where it will go,' and the next time you look at it it's so big you don't dare to do 
anything about it."  Id. (quoting Volcker). 
136 Pozsar et al., supra note 123 at 22–36, 46–53. 
? 
????? ??????????????????? ????
entering into repos and other short-term securities lending 
arrangements with MMMFs and other cash lenders. 137   The total 
volume of short-term, shadow-banking liabilities grew from less than 
$500 billion in 1980 to approximately $1 trillion in 1990, $6 trillion in 
2000, and more than $12 trillion in 2007.138   
When the shadow banking system reached its apex in 2007, the 
total amount of "shadow bank deposits" held by large banks and 
securities firms substantially exceeded the amount of traditional 
deposits held by FDIC-insured institutions.139  As Morgan Ricks has 
explained, the rapidly increasing volume of shadow-bank funding after 
1990 "can be understood as an increasing privatization of the broad 
money supply in the pre-crisis years."140  The growing reliance of 
major banks and securities broker-dealers on shadow-bank funding 
exposed them to severe liquidity problems when investors engaged in 
panicked "runs" on MMMFs, commercial paper, and repos during 
2007 and 2008.141  To prevent the failures of large banks and broker-
dealers, the Fed, FDIC, and Treasury provided a "360 [degree] 
backstop" for shadow banking liabilities through an array of "liquidity 
facilities, large-scale asset purchases and guarantee schemes." 142  
Those ad hoc rescue programs served as the "modern-day equivalents 
of deposit insurance."143  The collapse of shadow banking markets 
                                                                                                                                             
137 See id. 
138 Compare FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 32 (electing 
not to include uninsured bank deposits or Eurodollar deposits in its calculation of 
shadow banking funding), with RICKS, supra note 112, at 32–36 (including 
uninsured bank deposits and Eurodollar deposits in his classification of “private-
money claims”). 
139 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 32; see also 
Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 50–52; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking 
Profile: First Quarter 2008, 2 FDIC QUARTERLY 2, 15 (2008), 
https://www5.fdic.gov/qbp/2008mar/qbp.pdf (reporting that at the end of 2007, 
FDIC-insured depository institutions held about $8.4 trillion of deposits, including 
$4.3 trillion of FDIC-insured deposits and about $4.1 trillion of uninsured domestic 
and foreign deposits.); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Son Shin, Money, Liquidity, and 
Monetary Policy, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. 1, 1 (figure 1) (Jan. 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331004 (showing that lenders funded by the securities 
markets held $16.6 trillion of assets in mid-2007, compared with $12.8 trillion of 
assets held by regulated depository institutions).  
140 RICKS supra note 112, at 36. 
141 Gary Gorton, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ., 
425, 423–36, 443–48 (2009); Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 124, at 36–48; 
Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 2–7, 58–66. 
142 Pozsar et al., supra note 123, at 61, 64. 
143 Id.; see also RICKS supra note 112, at 96–101 (stating that the federal 
government's responses to the financial crisis "were aimed, with few exceptions, at 
propping up the private money-claim markets. . . . [E]very major category of private 
money-claim was specifically targeted with emergency stabilization programs in 
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during the financial crisis and the necessity for a massive bailout of 
shadow-banking liabilities cast a very dark cloud over the collective 
decision by federal authorities not to enforce Glass-Steagall's 
prohibition on deposit-taking by nonbanks.144   
2.? The Rapid Growth of Private-Label Securitization 
 
Securitization was the second major way in which the financial 
industry and federal authorities broke down Glass-Steagall's and 
BHCA's structural barriers.  Securitization is a process that creates 
bankruptcy-remote pools of loans and other payment obligations 
(receivables), which are then used as collateral for the issuance of 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other types of 
asset-backed securities (ABS).145  The process of securitization has 
been extensively analyzed elsewhere,146 and only a summary will be 
presented here.   
In a typical securitization, the sponsor – usually a large bank or a 
securities broker-dealer – either originates or purchases loans, pools 
the loans,  and transfers the loan pool to a bankruptcy-remote special 
purpose entity (SPE).147  The SPE sells the loan pool to a second SPE 
(which is usually organized as a trust) in exchange for the second 
SPE’s promise to pay for the loans after it has securitized the pool.148  
The second SPE issues ABS, which confer upon investors the right to 
receive designated streams of income from payments made on the 
loans in the pool.149  The second SPE hires a securities broker-dealer 
(frequently an affiliate of the sponsor) to underwrite the sale of ABS to 
investors.150  After the underwriting has been completed, the second 
SPE transfers the proceeds from the sale of ABS to the first SPE, and 
the first SPE transfers the sale proceeds to the sponsor.151  The second 
SPE manages the loan pool and, in many cases, the second SPE hires 
the sponsor (or another of the sponsor's affiliates) to act as servicing 
agent for the pooled loans. 152   The sponsor, the SPEs, the ABS 
underwriter, and the servicing agent all receive substantial fees for 
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144 RICKS, supra note 112, at 96–122, 184–99, 230–37. 
145 See FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13. 
146 See generally id.; see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1, 6-16 (LexisNexis 2004). 
147 See FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
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their roles in the securitization process.153   
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) began to securitize 
home mortgages in the late 1960s and early 1970s.154  At first, GSEs 
structured their "agency" RMBS as pass-through certificates that gave 
investors pro rata interests in the pooled mortgages.155  However, pass-
through certificates were not attractive to many investors because they 
were long-term instruments subject to prepayment risk and interest 
rate risk. 156   To attract a broader group of investors for RMBS, 
Lawrence Fink of First Boston and Lewis Ranieri of Salomon Brothers 
developed collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) for GSEs in 
the early 1980s.157  Unlike pass-through mortgage certificates, a CMO 
is a structured-finance vehicle whose securities are divided into 
multiple "tranches."158  Those tranches offer investors differing rights 
and priorities for payments of income and principal from the pooled 
mortgages.159  Junior tranches of CMOs receive higher payoffs but are 
exposed to greater risks of losses from prepayments or defaults on the 
pooled mortgages.160  In contrast, senior tranches of CMOs receive 
lower yields but also benefit from greater protection against losses.161   
Securities firms fought hard to prevent GSEs from capturing the 
entire market for issuing RMBS. 162   Ranieri helped the Reagan 
Administration to draft proposed legislation allowing securities 
broker-dealers to underwrite "private label" RMBS on a more equal 
footing with the GSEs. 163   In 1984, Congress included many of 
                                                                                                                                             
153 See KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: 
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE AND NEXT STEPS 43–51 (2011); see also 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 146, at 6–16. 
154 Jonathan J. McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of 
the Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 173, 176–78 
(2011). 
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156 GSEs include the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the 
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Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).  McConnell & Buser, supra note 154, at 
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Ranieri's proposals in the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act, which exempted private-label RMBS from state securities laws 
and also allowed insurance companies and pension funds to invest in 
private-label RMBS with high credit ratings.164  Two years later, the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 exempted tranches of private-label RMBS 
from the threat of double taxation.165  In response to both statutes, 
securities broker-dealers launched ambitious programs to underwrite 
private-label RMBS and ABS backed by a wide array of obligations, 
including credit card receivables, automobile loans, boat loans, 
commercial real estate loans, home equity loans, student loans, and 
lease receivables.166    
Commercial banks were equally determined to enter the private-
label RMBS and ABS markets.  However, two Supreme Court 
decisions stood in their way.167  In 1966, Walter Wriston’s Citibank 
obtained a ruling from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), which allowed the bank to establish a collective investment 
fund called a "Commingled Investment Account."168  The fund pooled 
and managed investments made by Citibank's customers, who received 
participating "units" in the fund.  Citibank's collective investment fund 
was effectively "a mutual fund by another name."169   
In 1971, the Supreme Court struck down the OCC's ruling and 
held that Glass-Steagall prohibited Citibank's fund. 170   The Court 
determined that the "units of participation" sold to customers were 
"securities" within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act, and 
Citibank, therefore, engaged in an unlawful "underwriting" when it 
sold those units to its customers.171  After reviewing Glass-Steagall's 
legislative history, the Court described a number of "hazards" and 
"financial dangers" that Congress sought to prohibit by passing Glass-
Steagall.172  Among other risks, Congress was concerned that a bank 
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166 FEIN, supra note 5, at § 13.01; Thomas R. Boemio & Gerald A. Edwards, Jr., 
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168 CLEVELAND. & HUERTAS, supra note 100, at 294. 
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sell mutual funds"). 
170 ICI v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 622–23. 
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would have a "salesman's stake" in promoting the distribution of 
securities underwritten by either the bank or its affiliate. 173  
Accordingly, the bank would be tempted (i) to make unsound loans to 
support the sale of those securities, and (ii) to provide biased 
investment advice to persuade its depositors and other customers to 
buy those securities.174  Congress also feared that banks could lose 
their "reputation" and their "customer good will" if they encouraged 
customers to buy bad investments that they or their affiliates had 
underwritten.175   
Thirteen years after ICI v. Camp, the Supreme Court issued a 
similar decision in Bankers Trust I. 176  Bankers Trust I struck down a 
Fed order that allowed Bankers Trust to act as agent for its corporate 
clients in selling their commercial paper to investors.177  Based on a 
“functional analysis,” the Fed argued that commercial paper was not a 
“security” within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act because a sale 
of commercial paper was closer to a commercial loan than an 
“investment transaction.”178  As in Camp, the Supreme Court applied a 
broad definition of “security” in Bankers Trust I and rejected the Fed’s 
attempt to distinguish between commercial paper and other types of 
debt securities.179  The Court also reaffirmed its analysis of Glass-
Steagall's purposes in Camp.180  Quoting Camp, the Court declared in 
Bankers Trust I that: 
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the 
investment banking business largely because it believed 
that the promotional incentives of investment banking 
and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the 
success of particular investment opportunities was 
destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial 
banking and of public confidence in the commercial 
banking system.181     
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179 Id. at 139–41, 149–57. 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s strong defense of Glass-Steagall's 
policies in ICI v. Camp and Bankers Trust I, large banks and federal 
bank regulators continued to launch assaults on Glass-Steagall’s and 
BHCA's structural barriers.  After its defeat in Bankers Trust I, the Fed 
issued a revised order that permitted Bankers Trust to sell commercial 
paper under a different legal rationale.182  Instead of claiming that 
commercial paper was not a “security,” the Fed’s revised order 
declared that Bankers Trust would not be engaged in a prohibited 
“underwriting” of securities as long as the bank sold commercial paper 
issued by its corporate clients only in private placements involving 
sophisticated institutional buyers. 183   The securities industry 
challenged the Fed's revised order.184  However, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Fed, and the 
Supreme Court denied further review.185   
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis in Bankers Trust II by stating 
that it owed “substantial deference” to the Fed's revised order in light 
of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron.186  Applying the 
first step of Chevron's two-step formula, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
applicable provisions of Glass-Steagall were "ambiguous," and 
Congress, therefore "has not clearly addressed the question" decided 
by the Fed.187  Proceeding to the second step of Chevron, the D.C. 
Circuit deferred to the Fed's "reasonable" determinations that Bankers 
Trust's sales of commercial paper in private placements (i) were 
permissible "brokerage" transactions falling within the "business of 
banking" defined in 12 U.S.C. § 24, as amended by Section 16 of 
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Glass-Steagall, 188  and (ii) did not represent a prohibited 
“underwriting” of securities under Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-
Steagall.189  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Fed’s position that it was 
“reasonable” to interpret Glass-Steagall's prohibition on 
“underwriting” as forbidding public offerings of securities but not 
private placements.190   
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that private placements of 
commercial paper would involve at least one of the “subtle hazards” 
identified in Camp and Bankers Trust I – namely, the danger that a 
bank would lose its “reputation” and the “confidence” of its customers 
if it encouraged them to buy unsound securities.191  However, the court 
dismissed the significance of that risk.192  The court concluded that 
Chevron “requires our deference to an agency’s reasonable 
construction of its statute's ambiguities,” and “an agency’s 
interpretation that impairs one of the statute's purposes but not others 
may surely nonetheless be reasonable.” 193   The D.C. Circuit's 
disregard of potential reputational risks from private placements 
proved to be a very serious miscalculation.  Major banks subsequently 
paid large fines and civil settlements after selling toxic subprime 
RMBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to institutional 
investors in private placements under the SEC's Rule 144A.194   
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Bankers Trust II provided a blueprint for subsequent federal court 
decisions upholding agency regulations and orders that opened 
loopholes in Glass-Steagall's and BHCA’s structural barriers. 195  
Courts repeatedly invoked Chevron deference as a justification for 
affirming agency rulings that used creative interpretations of 
"ambiguous" statutory language to circumvent Glass-Steagall's and 
BHCA's prohibitions.196    
In April 1987, the Fed authorized bank holding companies to 
establish “Section 20 subsidiaries,” which could underwrite and deal 
in “bank-ineligible securities” that were not lawful for banks to 
underwrite or trade under Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act.197  The 
Fed's Citicorp order allowed Section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite and 
trade four types of "bank-ineligible securities" – municipal revenue 
bonds, private-label RMBS, ABS backed by consumer loan 
receivables, and commercial paper.198  The Fed concluded that Section 
20 subsidiaries would not violate Glass-Steagall as long as they were 
not "engaged principally” in underwriting or dealing in “ineligible 
securities.” 199   The Fed’s Citicorp order required Section 20 
subsidiaries to focus most of their activities on underwriting and 
trading “bank-eligible” government securities. 200   Accordingly, the 
Fed limited the “bank-ineligible” securities activities of Section 20 
subsidiaries to five percent or less of their gross revenues.201   
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Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and Governor Wayne Angell 
dissented from the Citicorp order, which the Fed adopted by a 3-2 
vote. 201   Volcker and Angell stated that they supported broader 
securities powers for bank holding companies “as a matter of 
policy.”202  However, they argued, “the interpretation adopted by the 
majority would appear to make feasible . . . the affiliations of banks 
with some of the principal underwriting firms or investment houses of 
the country.”203  In Volcker's and Angell's view, “Such a legal result    
. . . is inconsistent with the intent of Congress in passing the Glass-
Steagall Act.”204  Volcker and Angell maintained that the Fed should 
not have issued the Citicorp order without “a fresh Congressional 
mandate.”205   
Volcker decided not to seek a third term as Fed Chairman, and his 
inability to block the deregulatory outcome in Citicorp was evidently a 
factor in that decision.206  Volcker’s dissent in Citicorp reflected his 
opposition to any “rush to deregulation” until Congress approved an 
“overall blueprint for change” that would preserve “the stability and 
impartiality” of the banking system and also prevent “conflicts of 
interest and undue concentrations of banking resources.”207  President 
Reagan appointed Alan Greenspan to succeed Volcker, in part because 
Greenspan was much more supportive of the Reagan Administration’s 
agenda for deregulating the financial industry.208   
The securities industry challenged the Fed’s Citicorp order, but the 
Second Circuit upheld the Fed and the Supreme Court denied further 
review.209  The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Citicorp order 
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represented a significant step toward “dismantl[ing] the wall of 
separation installed . . . by the Glass-Steagall Act.”210  However, like 
the D.C. Circuit in Bankers Trust II, the Second Circuit concluded that 
Chevron required judicial deference to the Fed’s “reasonable” 
interpretation of an “ambiguous” statute.211  Accordingly, the court 
observed, “Whether [George] Santayana’s notion that those who will 
not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it fairly characterizes 
the consequences of the [Fed’s] action is not for us to say.”212  The 
Second Circuit’s allusion to Santayana’s warning was tragically 
prescient, but unfortunately it did not alter the court’s deferential 
approach.   
The Second Circuit determined that Section 20 of Glass-Steagall 
was “ambiguous” on the question of whether banks could affiliate with 
companies that carried on a securities business but were not “engaged 
principally” in underwriting or trading bank-ineligible securities.213  
Given that ambiguity, the Second Circuit held that the Fed was 
“reasonable” in concluding that banks could affiliate with such 
companies under the common ownership of bank holding 
companies. 214   The court also determined that the term “engaged 
principally” was “intrinsically ambiguous,” and the Fed was 
“reasonable” in finding that Glass-Steagall allowed a Section 20 
subsidiary to derive five percent or less of its gross revenues from 
activities involving bank-ineligible securities.215   
Under Alan Greenspan’s leadership, the Fed steadily expanded the 
scope of its Section 20 orders.216  In 1989, the Fed allowed Section 20 
subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in all types of debt and equity 
securities, and the Fed also raised the revenue limit on bank-ineligible 
securities activities to ten percent.217  The D.C. Circuit upheld the 
Fed’s order, again noting the judicial “deference” that courts owed to 
the Fed’s determinations. 218   By 1996, Section 20 subsidiaries 
controlled one-fifth of the debt underwriting market and two percent 
of the equity underwriting market in the United States.219   
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In 1996, the Fed raised the revenue limit for bank-ineligible 
securities activities to twenty-five percent, and in 1997 the Fed 
removed numerous “firewalls” that had imposed tight restrictions on 
cross-marketing and other transactions between bank holding 
companies and their Section 20 subsidiaries.220  In response to the 
Fed's liberalized Section 20 rules, large domestic and foreign banks 
acquired dozens of small and midsized securities firms.221  By 1998, 
forty-five bank holding companies, including the twenty-five largest 
U.S. banks, had established Section 20 subsidiaries.222   
 
 ******************************************** 
  
The OCC pursued its own campaign to allow national banks to 
securitize residential mortgages and other loans directly, instead of 
relying on bank holding company affiliates.223  The OCC's campaign 
was part of its vigorous competition with Alan Greenspan's Fed for the 
position of deregulator-in-chief of the banking industry.224  The OCC 
and the Fed each wanted to secure the allegiance of the largest banking 
organizations by demonstrating that it was a "friendly regulator" and 
an unequivocal champion of deregulation.225   
In 1987, the OCC confirmed the authority of Security Pacific 
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National Bank to securitize residential mortgages that the bank had 
originated, and to sell private-label RMBS resulting from those 
securitizations.226  The securities industry sued the OCC and prevailed 
before a federal district court, but the Second Circuit overruled the 
district court and upheld the OCC's opinion.227   The district court 
determined that the bank's issuance and sale of RMBS was not a "mere 
sale of assets" and instead constituted a prohibited "underwriting" of 
"securities" under Section 21.228  The district court pointed out that (i) 
each securitization trust was "a separate entity from the bank," (ii) the 
pooled mortgages held by each trust had "a separate identity" from the 
bank's assets, (iii) the bank had "the sole choice of which mortgages it 
wants to shift to the trust," and (iv) the bank could, therefore, choose 
to "relegate to the trust those mortgages which it saw as most likely to 
be problems."229  Also, the bank would have "an interest in the success 
of the sales" of the RMBS, thereby tempting the bank to become "an 
advocate with an interest in supporting the sale of a particular 
security."230  After considering Glass-Steagall's purposes, the district 
court concluded that the OCC's opinion "does not take sufficient 
account of the role the bank may play in marketing the [RMBS]" or 
"the benefits that the bank hopes to gain" from selling the RMBS.231   
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning and 
upheld the OCC's opinion. 232   Applying "principles of deferential 
review," the Second Circuit agreed with the OCC that Security 
Pacific's sale of RMBS fell within the "business of banking" under 12 
U.S.C. § 24(Seventh), as either a direct or "incidental" component of 
the bank's authority to sell mortgages it had originated.233  The court 
also agreed with the OCC that any activity falling within the "business 
of banking" under Section 24(Seventh), as amended by Section 16 of 
Glass-Steagall, could not be construed as a violation of Section 21 of 
Glass-Steagall.234   
The RMBS at issue in Security Pacific were mortgage pass-
through certificates, which represented "fractional undivided interests 
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in the pool of mortgage loans."235  In view of the certificates' pass-
through structure, the OCC argued that the certificates were "legally 
transparent," and investors in the certificates were "informed 
purchasers" with "full disclosure of all material facts," including 
information about the "underlying loans." 236   The Second Circuit 
agreed with the OCC that "the nature of the transaction makes it 
unlikely that [Security Pacific] will make unsound loans so as to 
encourage purchase of the certificates."237   
Both the OCC and the Second Circuit contended that investors 
would be adequately protected because "the federal securities laws 
require full disclosure of all material facts concerning the [RMBS] and 
the offering."238  The Second Circuit declared that any "protection" for 
investors in the RMBS "must come from the securities law and the 
remedies they provide, not from the Glass-Steagall Act."239    
The OCC and the Second Circuit proved to be completely 
mistaken in their assumptions that (i) bank sponsors of RMBS would 
not have financial incentives to originate or purchase bad mortgages 
for securitization, (ii) the offering materials for RMBS would provide 
full disclosures of all material facts to investors, and (iii) investors 
could therefore protect themselves through due diligence.240  Those 
mistaken beliefs had massive costs and far-reaching consequences.241  
As the securitization trend gained momentum after 2000, banks and 
other lenders originated huge volumes of poorly-underwritten, high-
risk subprime and "Alt-A" mortgages. 242   The enormous fees that 
lenders could earn by originating and selling nonprime mortgages for 
securitization created perverse incentives and caused lenders to 
disregard sound underwriting principles and due diligence 
standards.243   
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Building on their previous success with CMOs, securities broker-
dealers and banks developed “structured-finance” RMBS that were 
divided into multiple tranches.244  The complexity of those RMBS 
made it very difficult for investors to evaluate the risks embodied in 
the various tranches.  Banks and broker-dealers also re-securitized 
“mezzanine” tranches of RMBS (tranches with intermediate credit 
ratings) to create CDOs, and then repeated that process by securitizing 
“mezzanine” tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared. 245   The 
objective of each structured-finance vehicle was to generate the 
highest possible number of tranches with “AAA” credit ratings so that 
they could be marketed to insurance companies, pension funds, mutual 
funds, GSEs, and other institutional investors.246  The complexity and 
opacity of CDO structures made it virtually impossible for investors to 
assess the risks of the re-securitized tranches of RMBS or CDOs that 
were included in the relevant asset pools.247   
The OCC used its victory in Security Pacific to justify subsequent 
rulings that allowed national banks to securitize a wide range of 
consumer and commercial loans and other receivables.248  The OCC 
also permitted national banks to securitize loans that they did not 
originate but instead purchased from other lenders.249  In 1996, the 
OCC amended its regulations governing bank-eligible securities and 
authorized national banks to invest in “Type IV” and “Type V” 
securities, which included “marketable” private-label RMBS, ABS, 
CDOs, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).250  Thus, 
the OCC provided carte blanche for a wide range of securitization 
activities by national banks, just as the Fed had done for Section 20 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 
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The Fed’s and OCC’s orders spurred a rapid growth in 
securitization activities by banking organizations during the 1990s.251  
The total amount of outstanding private-label RMBS and other ABS 
increased from less than $100 billion in 1990 to $900 billion in 1999, 
and large banks accounted for a significant share of that market.252  
Securitization offered multiple benefits to banks in the form of 
reduced capital requirements, new sources of funding through the 
capital markets, greatly expanded fee income, and the ability to move 
credit risk off their balance sheets.253   
After Congress passed GLBA, which removed all remaining 
restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms, the 
largest banks and securities broker-dealers established vertically 
integrated structures that included every step in the securitization 
chain from loan origination to the creation and marketing of CDOs 
and CDOs-squared.254  As that process unfolded, the total outstanding 
volume of private-label RMBS, CMBS, ABS, and CDOs continued to 
grow from $1.6 trillion in 2001 to $3 trillion in 2004 and $5 trillion in 
2006.255  It is now widely agreed that securitization of high-risk loans 
played a central role in fueling the toxic credit bubble that led to the 
financial crisis of 2007-09.256   
3.? The Explosion of OTC Derivatives 
 
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were the third major vehicle 
that large financial institutions and federal regulators used to break 
down the structural barriers between the banking industry and the 
securities and insurance sectors.257  Derivatives are financial contracts 
whose value is determined by reference to some underlying asset, 
obligation, index, or rate (the underlying), such as an equity stock, 
debt instrument, stock index, commodity, interest rate, or currency 
exchange rate. 258   Derivatives are typically used either to hedge 
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against various types of risks or to speculate about future changes in 
the value of the underlying. 259   Exchange-traded derivatives are 
standardized contracts that are publicly traded on futures and options 
exchanges, while OTC derivatives are customized contracts that are 
privately negotiated between “dealers” (large financial institutions that 
specialize in creating and marketing OTC derivatives) and “end-
users,” such as commercial and industrial firms or institutional 
investors.260   
Exchange-traded futures and options based on changes in interest 
rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices became popular 
vehicles for risk management and speculation in the 1970s.261  The 
volatility of interest rates, currency rates, and commodity prices 
increased significantly during that period in response to rising inflation 
and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange 
rates.262  In 1974, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) to oversee markets for exchange-traded 
derivatives established pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act 
(CEA).263  The CEA, as amended in 1974, prohibited off-exchange 
contracts for future delivery of commodities unless the contracts were 
settled by actual physical delivery.264  However, the 1974 legislation 
included the “Treasury Amendment,” which exempted a number of 
financial contracts that were not traded on futures or options 
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exchanges.265  When OTC derivatives emerged in the early 1980s, 
their status was highly uncertain under the 1974 legislation.266   
Markets for OTC currency swaps and OTC interest rate swaps 
grew rapidly during the 1980s, and the largest U.S. banks and 
securities firms captured the lion’s share of both markets.267   The 
CFTC suggested in 1987 that it might attempt to regulate OTC swaps, 
but the major swaps dealers threatened to move their business overseas 
if the CFTC did so.268  The CFTC “backed down” and issued a policy 
statement in 1989.269  The CFTC’s 1989 policy statement declared that 
the agency would refrain from regulating “qualifying” OTC swaps that 
fell within a defined “safe harbor.” 270   To qualify for that “safe 
harbor,” OTC swaps were required to have “individually tailored 
terms,” could not be traded on or connected to “a clearing organization 
or a margin system,” and could not be “marketed to the general 
public.”271   
In 1992, Congress passed further amendments to the CEA, which 
expressly authorized the CFTC to exempt certain types of OTC swaps 
from regulation under the CEA.272  The CFTC responded by issuing a 
regulation in 1993 that replaced its 1989 policy statement.273  The 
1993 rule exempted OTC swaps from regulation under the CEA if the 
swaps were not “standardized as to their material economic terms” and 
if the parties to those swaps were “eligible swap participants,” 
including regulated financial institutions, qualified business firms, 
state and local governments, institutional investors, and wealthy 
individuals.274  However, derivatives dealers and end-users continued 
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to have significant concerns about the precise scope and legally 
binding effect of the 1993 rule’s exemptions for OTC swaps.275   
 
******************************************** 
 
Despite lingering uncertainties about the legal status of OTC 
swaps, the OCC moved aggressively to expand the authority of 
national banks to engage in derivatives transactions during the 1980s 
and 1990s. 276   Saule Omarova has provided a comprehensive and 
insightful analysis of the OCC’s campaign to expand the derivatives 
powers of national banks,277 and only a summary overview of that 
campaign will be presented here. 
In 1987 and 1988, the OCC allowed national banks to enter into 
OTC swaps and exchange-traded derivatives based on interest rates, 
currency rates, and commodity price indexes for precious metals.278  
Using a “look-through” approach, the OCC argued that those types of 
derivatives were comparable to discounting promissory notes and 
trading in foreign currencies and precious metals, which were 
activities expressly authorized for national banks under the definition 
of the “business of banking” in 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh).279   
The OCC used a more aggressive “functional equivalency” 
analysis to permit national banks to engage in a much broader range of 
commodity-related derivatives between 1987 and 1992.280  The OCC 
used its “functional equivalency” approach to approve new derivatives 
activities by extrapolating from the OCC’s previously authorized and 
purportedly comparable activities.281  For example, the OCC asserted 
that commodity swaps were “functionally equivalent” to interest rate 
and currency swaps, which the OCC had previously authorized for 
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the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 258, at 9–12; see also infra notes 646–56, 710–
11 (describing concerns among derivatives dealers and end-users between 1994 and 
1999 that the federal government might take action to regulate OTC derivatives). 
276 Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 697. 
277 See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed 
the ‘Business of Banking, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV 1041 (2009). 
278 Id. at 1056. 
279 Id. at 1058–10.  See generally OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and 
Derivatives Activities, Fourth Quarter 2007, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-
markets/derivatives/dq407.pdf (discussing derivatives activities).   
280 Omarova, supra note 277, at 1060. 
281 Id. at 1060–61. 
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national banks.282  To support its claim, the OCC argued that, for each 
type of swap, the dealer bank acted as a “financial intermediary on 
behalf of its customers, making and receiving payments,” and the bank 
also entered into hedging transactions so that “the only risk retained by 
the bank would be credit risk, the same risk that the bank assumed 
when it made a loan.”283  By focusing solely on credit risk, the OCC’s 
analysis “failed to take into account the full complexity of risks 
associated with commodity [swaps].”284   
In the mid-1990s, the OCC used the “financial intermediary” 
concept to develop a “financial intermediation” theory of banking 
powers, which justified an almost limitless scope for the “business of 
banking” under the National Bank Act. 285   The OCC’s “financial 
intermediation” theory asserted that the “business of banking” should 
“encompass virtually any modern form of financial intermediation, 
broadly understood as a financial activity for customers’ account[s] 
involving exchanges of payments and assumption or transfer of 
financial risk.” 286   Under the OCC’s “financial intermediation” 
analysis, “the statutory concept of the ‘business of banking’ . . . 
effectively ceased to function as a potentially limiting device with 
respect to commercial banks’ activities and risk profile.”287   
The OCC used its hyper-elastic concept of the “business of 
banking” to authorize an ever-expanding array of derivatives activities 
for national banks. 288   For example, in 1993 and 1995, the OCC 
allowed national banks to hedge their exposures to commodity swaps 
by making or taking physical delivery of the underlying commodities, 
transferring documents of title, and engaging in other related activities, 
including “storing, transporting, obtaining, or disposing of such 
commodities.289  The OCC argued that bank ownership and delivery of 
physical commodities for hedging purposes was a “logical outgrowth” 
of the authority of national banks to act as dealers for commodity 
swaps, even though the OCC acknowledged that banks were not 
allowed to purchase or own physical commodities for investment 
purposes.290    
                                                                                                                                             
282 Id. at 1060–63, 1065.   
283 Id. at 1066 (quoting in part the OCC’s No-Objection Letter No. 90-1, Feb. 
16, 1990). 
284 Id. at 1073. 
285 Id. at 1076. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 1078–79. 
290 Id. at 1078 (quoting OCC Interpretive Letter No. 684, dated Aug. 4, 1995).  
From 2003 to 2006, the OCC relied on its earlier opinions allowing banks to own 
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A notable example of the OCC’s step-by-step expansion of the 
derivatives powers of national banks occurred when the OCC 
proceeded from (i) allowing banks to offer equity-linked deposits, with 
payoffs based on stock indexes, to (ii) permitting banks to enter into 
equity swaps as hedges against their risk exposures to equity-linked 
deposits, and ultimately (iii) authorizing banks to buy equity stocks as 
hedges against their risk exposures to equity swaps.291  In 1988, the 
OCC allowed Chase Manhattan National Bank (Chase) to offer 
certificates of deposit whose payment of “interest” was based on the 
performance of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (equity-linked 
CDs).292  The OCC declared that equity-linked CDs fell within the 
express authority of national banks to accept deposits, and it dismissed 
the relevance of Chase’s use of a stock index to determine the amount 
of “interest” payable on those deposits. 293   Similarly, the OCC 
assigned no legal significance to the fact that Chase invested the 
proceeds of equity-linked CDs in exchange-traded S&P 500 index 
futures and therefore assumed a significant stock market risk. 294  
Chase was required to pay depositors for any increase in the value of 
S&P 500 futures, and to absorb any losses if the value of S&P 500 
futures declined, as Chase remained obligated to repay the depositors’ 
originally invested principal when their CDs matured.295  The OCC 
fully recognized the stock market risk created by equity-linked CDs, 
and the OCC, therefore, allowed Chase to purchase long and short 
positions in S&P 500 futures to hedge against that risk.296   
The mutual fund industry challenged the OCC’s order, alleging 
that Chase’s offering of equity-linked CDs and Chase’s purchase of 
S&P 500 futures for hedging purposes violated the Glass-Steagall 
Act.297  However, a federal district court dismissed the lawsuit.298  The 
                                                                                                                                             
physical commodities solely for hedging purposes to justify even more expansive 
orders.  Id. at 1085–86.  Those orders permitted national banks to engage in a broad 
range of activities involving physical commodities (including electricity, oil, natural 
gas, coal, and metals).  Id. at 1085, 1093.  The Fed followed suit by allowing several 
of the largest financial holding companies to engage in a wide variety of 
“complementary” activities involving physical commodities.  See id. at 1085–87, 
1090–96. 
291 See id. at 1077–87. 
292 Id. at 1063–64. 
293 Id.  The OCC also allowed national banks to offer CDs with interest rates 
based on the performance of commodity indexes, and to hedge their exposures by 
purchasing exchange-traded commodity index futures.  Id. at 1063, 1066. 
294 Id. at 1064. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 1063–65; see also Investment Co. Institute v. Ludwig (ICI v. Ludwig), 
884 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1995). 
297 See ICI v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. at 4–5. 
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district court agreed with the OCC that “the plain language of the 
[Glass-Steagall] Act simply does not encompass stock index futures” 
as either “stock” or “securities” that banks were barred from 
underwriting or trading. 299   The district court was also strongly 
influenced by a 1995 Supreme Court decision, which accorded great 
deference to the OCC’s interpretation of the scope of the “business of 
banking” in another context.300   
In ICI v. Ludwig, the OCC and the district court applied a 
literalistic and narrow reading of the meaning of “stock” and 
“securities” under the Glass-Steagall Act.301  The OCC and the district 
court rejected the mutual fund industry’s attempt to use a functional 
and risk-based analysis to demonstrate that Chase was effectively 
engaging in "stock-trading” by offering equity-linked CDs and by 
investing in S&P 500 futures to hedge against the bank’s exposures to 
those CDs.302  A functional and risk-based approach – similar to the 
analysis that the Supreme Court applied to Citibank’s “Commingled 
Investment Account” in Camp and Bankers Trust’s sale of commercial 
paper in Bankers Trust I – would almost certainly have resulted in a 
finding that Chase’s offering of equity-linked CDs and Chase’s 
investments in S&P 500 futures constituted a prohibited 
                                                                                                                                             
298 Id. at 5.  
299 See id. at 5. 
300 Id.  In Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 513 U.S. 251 
(1995), the Supreme Court upheld an OCC opinion that allowed national banks to 
sell annuities.  The OCC’s opinion in VALIC stated that the sale of annuities was an 
activity within the banks’ “traditional role as financial intermediaries” and therefore 
qualified as an “incidental powe[r] . . . necessary to carry on the business of 
banking.”  Id. at 257 (quoting the OCC’s opinion).  The Supreme Court held that, 
under Chevron, the OCC’s opinion was entitled to “controlling weight” as a 
“permissible construction” of the National Bank Act.  Id. at 257.  The Court agreed 
with the OCC’s position that “the ‘business of banking’ is not limited to the 
enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller therefore has discretion 
to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated."  Id. at 258, n.2.  The 
Court stated that “the Comptroller’s discretion must be kept within reasonable 
bounds,” but the Court did not adopt any legal test to define the outer limits of those 
“reasonable bounds.”  Id.  Thus, VALIC “failed to articulate a clear principled 
standard of what constituted the ‘business of banking’,” and the OCC “interpreted 
VALIC as a full endorsement of the agency’s long-held broad view of the bank 
powers clause.”  Omarova, supra note 277, at 1053.  
301 See ICI v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. at 5 (noting that “[t]he OCC relies on a strict 
reading” of “the plain language of the [Glass-Steagall] Act,” and accepting that 
approach). 
302 Id. (noting, without disagreement, the plaintiff’s claim that Glass-Steagall 
prohibited “stock-trading by banks for their own accounts,” but agreeing with the 
OCC that the court should reject the plaintiff’s “attempts to equate ownership of 
stock index futures to stock speculation through its analysis of the comparative risks 
of each investment”). 
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“underwriting” of “securities” and a forbidden “dealing” in “stock” 
under Glass-Steagall.303   
The OCC’s opinion and the district court’s decision in ICI v. 
Ludwig were typical of the asymmetric analysis that federal banking 
agencies and most courts applied during the agency-driven 
deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s.304  Federal 
agencies repeatedly used “functional equivalency” as a one-way 
ratchet to expand – but never to limit – the permitted activities of 
banking organizations.305  Most court decisions either endorsed the 
regulators’ approach or deferred to the regulators’ ultimate decisions 
under Chevron. 306   As indicated in ICI v. Ludwig, the financial 
industry and federal regulators took full advantage of the fact that 
“there was no explicit provision in Glass-Steagall against trading in 
derivatives products.”307   
In a 1994 opinion, the OCC declared that national banks could 
enter into equity swaps and equity index swaps to hedge their 
exposures to stock index futures resulting from equity-linked CDs.308  
The OCC asserted that “swap contracts, are in some respects, direct 
descendants of traditional deposit contracts” because a bank and its 
customers exchanged streams of payments under swap contracts as 
they did under deposits.309  The OCC also argued that “equity swaps 
and equity index swaps are permissible for national banks as a 
financial intermediation activity,” and those swaps would also benefit 
banks by “expanding their customer base, and increas[ing] their 
revenues.”310   Thus, the OCC’s authorization of equity swaps and 
equity index swaps relied on “functional equivalency” and “financial 
intermediation” theories and completely disregarded the additional 
                                                                                                                                             
303 See supra notes 167–81 and accompanying text (discussing ICI v. Camp and 
Bankers Trust I).  
304 See supra notes 116–19, 226–34, 280–84, 292–303, infra notes 308–11 and 
accompanying text (providing examples of rulings by federal agencies and courts 
during the 1980s and 1990s that used "functional equivalency" concepts to expand, 
but not to restrict, the powers of banks and bank holding companies); see also FEIN, 
supra note 5, §§ 1.05, 4.05[A] (explaining that  judicial deference was an important 
factor in many court decisions upholding agency rulings that opened loopholes in 
Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's structural barriers). 
305 See id. 
306 See id. 
307 TETT, supra note 259, at 17–18. 
308 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 892 (Letter 
from Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. to Rep. James A. Leach, Sept. 
13, 2000), http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-
precedents/sep00/int892.pdf. 
309 Id. 
310 See id. (discussing OCC Interpretive Letter No. 652 (Sept. 13, 1994)). 
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stock market risks that banks would incur under equity swaps.311  The 
1994 equity swap opinion also reflected the OCC’s eagerness to give 
national banks every conceivable opportunity to expand their 
revenues.312   
In 2000, the OCC issued Interpretive Letter 892 (hereinafter IL 
892), which authorized national banks to purchase equity stocks as 
physical hedges against their exposures to equity swaps and equity 
index swaps.313  The OCC issued IL 892 after it secretly allowed three 
large national banks to buy equity stocks for hedging purposes.314  
Congressman Jim Leach, a co-sponsor of GLBA, became aware of the 
OCC’s actions and strongly criticized the OCC.315  The OCC issued IL 
892 to justify what it had done.316   
IL 892 declared that the OCC’s earlier opinions regarding equity-
linked CDs, stock index futures, and equity swaps supported the 
OCC’s view that national banks could invest in equity stocks for 
hedging purposes as part of the “business of banking.”317  IL 892 
provides a striking illustration of how the OCC relied on its previous 
rulings expanding the scope of permissible banking activities to 
provide a “bootstrap” for authorizing new and even broader 
activities. 318   The OCC also invoked its “financial intermediation” 
theory and its “[h]edging risks” rationale to justify its decision 
allowing national banks to buy equity stocks as physical hedges 
against their exposures under equity derivatives.319   
IL 892 pointed out that national banks would “retain additional 
revenues . . . and enjoy substantial cost savings” by making direct 
purchases of equity stocks instead of entering into “mirror” hedging 
transactions with their broker-dealer affiliates. 320   Through direct 
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312 Id.; see also Omarova, supra note 277, at 1069–72. 
313 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 1–2. 
314 Michael Schroeder, Leach Criticizes Bank Regulator on Stock Rule, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A38. 
315 Id. 
316 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 1-2; Omarova, 
supra note 277, at 1079–80.  Rep. Leach was particularly concerned that purchases 
of corporate stock by national banks could potentially result in “breaching the wall 
between banking and commerce.”  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra 
note 308, at 1. 
317 Id. at 1–2. 
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supra note 277, at 1080. 
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purchases of equity stocks, national banks could eliminate the extra 
transaction costs associated with “mirror transactions” conducted by 
their broker-dealer affiliates.321  Moreover, national banks would earn 
additional profits through “a reduction in net interest expense” because 
mirror transactions by nonbank affiliates were “funded at the 
borrowing rate of their holding companies, rather than the more 
favorable rate enjoyed by the banks.”322   
IL 892 argued that national banks should be allowed to make the 
highest possible profits by conducting all of their derivative activities 
in-house instead of through broker-dealer affiliates. 323   The OCC 
emphasized the significant cost-of-funding advantage that national 
banks enjoyed, compared with their parent holding companies and 
broker-dealer affiliates. 324   National banks enjoyed that advantage 
because (i) they could obtain low-cost funding through their FDIC-
insured deposits, (ii) they could secure emergency loans through the 
Fed’s discount window, and (iii) they could enter into interbank 
payments on Fedwire that were guaranteed by the Fed.325   
Thus, IL 892 enabled national banks to reap additional profits from 
their cost-of-funding advantage, but the OCC conveniently ignored the 
fact that conducting derivatives-related activities inside national banks 
(instead of their broker-dealer affiliates) created a significantly higher 
risk of inflicting losses on the federal government and taxpayers.326  IL 
892 reflected the OCC’s general policy of “achieving a positive 
outcome for the banks seeking an expansion of their derivatives 
powers,” as well as the OCC’s failure to consider “potential systemic 
risks” posed by the “complex derivatives businesses” of national 
                                                                                                                                             
“nonbank affiliate.”  See id. at 2.  The nonbank affiliate would then hedge its 
exposure to the bank under the “short” equity swap by creating a “long” position 
through the purchase of equity stock.  Id. at 2–3. 
321 Id. at 3. 
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323 Id. at 3, 16. 
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325 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank's Inadequate Response, supra note 68, at 1044; see 
also CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 5, at 3. 
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significant cost-of-funding advantage that banks enjoyed, compared to their holding 
company affiliates, was demonstrated in 2011, when the Fed allowed Bank of 
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banks.327   
By permitting national banks to purchase equity stocks, IL 892 
contravened the explicit terms of the fifth sentence of 12 U.S.C. § 24 
(Seventh), as amended by Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act.328  The 
fifth sentence states: “Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise 
permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the 
purchase by [a national bank] for its own account of any shares of 
stock of any corporation.”329  IL 892 asserted that “the fifth sentence   
. . . is not a complete bar on bank purchases of stock.”330  According to 
the OCC, the fifth sentence is merely intended “to make clear” that the 
authorization for national banks to purchase “investment securities” 
under the second sentence of Section 24 (Seventh) does not provide an 
independent “source of authority for national banks to purchase 
stock.”331   
The OCC’s interpretation of the fifth sentence is completely 
undermined by the fourth sentence of Section 24 (Seventh), which was 
also amended by Section 16 of Glass-Steagall.332  The fourth sentence 
defines “investment securities” as “marketable obligations evidencing 
indebtedness of any person . . . in the form of bonds, notes, and/or 
debentures commonly known as investment securities under such 
further definition . . . as may by regulation be prescribed by the 
[OCC].” 333   Thus, the fourth sentence of Section 24 (Seventh) 
specifically defines “investment securities” to include only debt 
securities and to exclude stock.  Congress, therefore, had no reason to 
add the fifth sentence unless Congress intended to prohibit national 
banks from buying all equity stocks in the absence of specific 
statutory permission.  In fact, Congress has passed several laws 
granting specific authority for national banks to buy stock in 
designated classes of corporations.334   
Congress's repeated grants of specific, narrowly-defined 
authorities for stock investments by national banks plainly indicate – 
                                                                                                                                             
327 Omarova, supra note 277, at 1105, 1106. 
328 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §16, 48 Stat. 162, 185 (1933). 
329 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2008) (emphasis added). 
330 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 308, at 12. 
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332 48 Stat. 162, 185. 
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as confirmed by the terms of the fifth sentence – that national banks 
may not purchase any other types of corporate stock without express 
statutory permission. 335   Thus, IL 892's interpretation of the fifth 
sentence flies in the face of the relevant statutory context and also runs 
afoul of the well-established canon against construing a statute in a 
way that would make it "meaningless" or mere "surplusage."336  IL 
892 was not challenged in any lawsuit, and the courts have never 
considered the validity of the OCC's interpretation of the fifth sentence 
of Section 24(Seventh).337   
The OCC's derivatives rulings reveal the intellectual gymnastics 
that the agency was willing to perform to enable national banks to 
offer the broadest possible range of OTC derivatives and other 
financial services to their customers. 338   By acting as derivatives 
dealers, national banks could provide synthetic substitutes for a wide 
range of securities and futures contracts, including equity stocks, debt 
instruments, and exchange-traded options.339  OTC derivatives largely 
escaped regulation during the 1980s and 1990s because they occupied 
an "ambiguous position spanning the categories of futures, securities, 
and loans." 340   Consequently, "regulators who were favorable to 
deregulation could happily exempt such contracts from existing 
rules." 341   OTC derivatives helped the largest banks and federal 
                                                                                                                                             
335 Applying the canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius (the special mention of one thing in a statute indicates an intent to exclude 
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337 At the request of Congressman Leach, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
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25, at 337–38; see also Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 315–18 (2d Cir. 
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340 Funk & Hirschman, supra note 16, at 690. 
341 Id. 
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banking agencies to undermine Glass-Steagall by blurring “the 
boundary between . . . commercial and investment banking."342   
 
******************************************** 
 
In the mid-1990s, J.P. Morgan & Co. (JPMC) introduced a new 
type of derivative, the credit default swap (CDS), which helped to 
break down BHCA's boundary wall separating banks from the 
insurance business.343  In 1995, JPMC persuaded the OCC and the Fed 
to allow banks to enter into CDS as dealers and end-users.344  JPMC 
also convinced the regulators that banks could reduce their capital 
requirements by purchasing CDS protection against the risk of defaults 
on their loans.345   
In a CDS transaction, the "protection buyer" purchases protection 
against specified events of default on a designated bond or other debt 
instrument, while the "protection seller" provides that protection in 
return for the buyer's payment of periodic premiums.346   As Alan 
Blinder observed, "A CDS is an insurance contract posing as a 
derivative. . . . If the bond never defaults, which is the usual case, the 
seller wins and the buyer loses.  But in the event of default, the seller 
loses big time.  It's classic insurance."347   
JPMC did not stop with CDS contracts.  In the late 1990s, JPMC's 
derivatives team created a more complex structure known as 
"BISTRO," which was the first synthetic collateralized debt obligation 
(synthetic CDO). 348   BISTRO brought together the worlds of 
derivatives and securitization.349   
To create BISTRO, JPMC assembled a pool of $9.7 billion of 
CDS, which provided protection against defaults on loans made by 
JPMC to more than 300 companies.350  JPMC bundled those CDS into 
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Steagall, swaps . . . contributed to its eventual formal repeal."). 
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a securitized pool managed by a synthetic CDO.351  The CDO issued 
$700 million of tranched CDO securities to investors, while JPMC 
retained $9 billion of "super-senior" risk if the total volume of defaults 
on the pooled CDS exceeded $700 million.352  JPMC got rid of that 
"super-senior" risk by entering into credit derivatives with AIG 
Financial Products, a London subsidiary of the insurance giant AIG.353   
BISTRO was a prime example of how banks used securitization 
and derivatives to accomplish large-scale tax avoidance and regulatory 
capital arbitrage.  As was typical in securitization deals, JPMC 
established a "special purpose vehicle" (SPV) in an offshore tax haven 
to hold BISTRO's securitized CDS.354   Locating the SPV in a tax 
haven immunized the SPV's cash flows from taxation.355  In addition, 
the Fed and the OCC agreed to reduce JPMC's regulatory capital 
requirements by eighty percent for the corporate loans protected by 
BISTRO's pooled CDS, because JPMC obtained credit protection for 
its exposures on those CDS from AIG, a AAA-rated company.356  
Thus, as Gillian Tett explained, “BISTRO pulled off a dance around 
the Basel [international bank capital] rules.  The feat was so clever that 
some bankers started to joke that 'BISTRO' really stood for 'BIS Total 
Rip Off,' referring to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), 
which had overseen the Basel Accord.”357   
BISTRO confirmed the ability of the largest financial institutions 
to avoid taxes and reduce their regulatory capital requirements by 
using securitization and derivatives. 358   BISTRO also provided a 
template for Wall Street’s subsequent creation of CDS and synthetic 
CDOs based on subprime mortgages and RMBS, instead of corporate 
loans.359  The BISTRO concept had disastrous effects when it was 
applied to the subprime mortgage market. 360   CDS and synthetic 
CDOs enabled a wide range of financial institutions and other 
institutional investors to place multiple, overlapping bets on the 
performance of designated tranches of subprime RMBS.  Those 
pyramids of bets collapsed, and greatly intensified the resulting losses 
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when borrowers defaulted on the underlying subprime mortgages.361   
The bank-friendly actions of the OCC and the Fed helped to 
promote a tremendous boom in OTC derivatives markets after 1985, 
just as they had done for securitization.362  The aggregate notional 
value of OTC derivatives in global markets increased rapidly from $7 
trillion in 1989 to $88 trillion in 1999 and $595 trillion in 2007.363  
The total notional value of credit derivatives grew at an even faster 
rate, “rising from only $180 million in 1997 to $1 trillion in 2001 . . . 
and $58 trillion in 2007.”364  The top U.S. commercial bank dealers 
controlled a significant share of the global markets for OTC 
derivatives, as the combined notional value of their derivatives 
contracts grew from $5 trillion in 1990 to $38 trillion in 2000 and 
$159 trillion in 2007, including $14 trillion of credit derivatives.365   
III.?AN IDEOLOGY OF COMPREHENSIVE DEREGULATION LED TO THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE RIEGLE-NEAL ACT, GLBA AND CFMA 
As described above in Part II, during the 1980s and 1990s large 
banks persuaded federal agencies and courts to open a number of 
loopholes in the legal barriers that separated banks from the securities 
and insurance sectors.366  However, those loopholes were subject to 
many restrictions and did not allow banks to establish full-scale 
affiliations with securities firms and insurance companies. 367  
Executives of big banks were far from satisfied with the limited 
victories they had achieved.  To accomplish their long-range goal of 
building financial conglomerates similar to European universal banks, 
leaders of the big-bank lobby needed to convince Congress to pass 
three major pieces of legislation.   
The first item on the big-bank agenda was to repeal Glass-
Steagall’s and BHCA’s constraints on interstate expansion by banks 
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and bank holding companies.368  The second element was to repeal 
Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s prohibitions that prevented banks from 
establishing full-scale affiliations with securities firms and insurance 
companies.369  The final component was to insulate over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives from any substantive regulation by the CFTC or 
SEC.370   
A.? Efforts to Authorize Interstate Banking and to Repeal Glass-
Steagall Did Not Succeed during the 1980s but Provided the 
Foundation for the Treasury Department’s 1991 Deregulatory 
Plan 
 
In January 1981, the outgoing Carter Administration issued a 
report calling for the phased removal of restrictions on interstate 
banking and branching. 371   With one relatively minor exception, 
Congress did not adopt President Carter’s proposals. 372   However, 
Carter’s proposals set the stage for an extensive debate throughout the 
1980s regarding the potential benefits and risks of interstate 
banking.373   
In March 1981, the banking industry called on the new Reagan 
Administration to remove Glass-Steagall’s barriers to bank 
involvement in securities activities. 374   The American Bankers 
Association (ABA) declared that its campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall 
was “gaining momentum” because of “a political drift toward 
deregulation.” 375   However, the ABA’s proposals faced strong 
opposition from the securities industry and independent community 
banks.376   
In December 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan announced 
that the Reagan Administration would submit a proposal to Congress 
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for a phased repeal of Glass-Steagall.377  Secretary Regan declared that 
the Reagan Administration wanted to “remov[e] artificial barriers 
between commercial banking and investment banking” as part of the 
Administration’s broader campaign to eliminate “excessive and 
outmoded government regulation” and demolish “barriers hindering 
free market activity.”378  As a first step toward those goals, the Reagan 
Administration urged Congress to allow nonbank subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies to underwrite and deal in state and local revenue 
bonds and mutual fund shares, and to engage in a limited number of 
other securities activities.379   
The largest U.S. banks eagerly supported the Carter and Reagan 
proposals for interstate banking and repeal of Glass-Steagall.380  Until 
he retired in 1984, Citibank chairman Walter Wriston was the banking 
industry’s “recognized visionary leader” in pushing for comprehensive 
deregulation.381  Wriston joined Citibank in 1946 and rose through the 
ranks to become president in 1967 and chairman in 1970.382  Wriston 
had an intense dislike for government regulation in general and the 
New Deal in particular.383  As a Wall Street economist noted, “There 
was something emotional about [Wriston’s] drive [for deregulation]     
. . . I felt Wriston wanted simply to dismantle the financial system as 
we knew it.”384  Wriston explained “his passion for breaking down old 
restraints on bank operations” in the following terms: “[m]y 
experience has been you either move forward or you die – it’s true in 
all biology.”385   
Wriston dreamed of transforming Citibank (and its holding 
company, Citicorp) into a “global financial services corporation” that 
would “change the face of banking.”386  Wriston wanted Citibank to be 
an “all-around bank” that provided a “one-stop financial center” for its 
retail and institutional customers, much as Citibank’s predecessor 
(National City Bank) had done in the 1920s under Charles Mitchell’s 
leadership.387  As noted above, Wriston pioneered the use of large-
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denomination, negotiable-rate CDs and Eurodollar deposits that 
enabled Citibank and other large banks to circumvent Regulation Q’s 
restrictions on deposit interest rates in the 1960s.388   
Wriston also developed a new type of loan – the floating-rate 
syndicated loan.389  This innovative form of credit helped Citibank to 
expand its lending to large corporations and foreign governments.390  
Floating-rate loans provided credit at an agreed spread over the 
variable cost of Eurodollar funding in London, thereby shifting the 
risk of future changes in interest rates to the borrowers.391  In addition, 
the process of syndicating a loan enabled Citibank to play a role 
similar to a “bond underwriter, negotiating the terms of a credit with 
the borrower and then arranging for the participation of other banks” 
in the syndicate.392  By the early 1970s, floating-rate syndicated loans 
were the dominant source of bank credit for multinational corporations 
and foreign governments.393  Syndicated loans permitted Citibank and 
other large U.S. banks “to play the same international role that bond 
financing had played in the 1920s.”394   
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sales of high-risk foreign bonds during the 1920s).  The very bad performance of 
syndicated LDC loans arranged by money center banks during the 1970s and early 
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Citibank earned handsome fees for acting as the “lead” bank in 
syndicated loans, and it soon began to make floating-rate syndicated 
loans in the United States to business firms, commercial real-estate 
ventures, energy projects, and local and state governments. 395  
Syndicated loans brought Citibank and other large U.S. banks closer to 
the investment banking model because “[t]he process of loan 
syndication is similar to the formation of an underwriting syndicate for 
publicly issued debt securities, and syndicated loans are often viewed 
by borrowers as a ‘substitute’ for underwritten bonds.”396   
Wriston failed, however, when he attempted to build a mutual fund 
business at Citibank. 397   As described above, the Supreme Court 
invalidated Citibank’s “Commingled Investment Account” in its 1971 
Camp decision. 398   Despite that setback, Wriston spearheaded the 
banking industry’s campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall until he retired 
in 1984, and his successors (John Reed and Sandy Weill) continued to 
lead that fight until Congress enacted GLBA in 1999.399   
JPMC was probably the second most active participant in the 
banking industry’s assault on Glass-Steagall.  After World War II, 
JPMC built up a substantial investment banking business in overseas 
markets, where Glass-Steagall’s limitations did not apply.400  Along 
with Citicorp and Bankers Trust, JPMC persuaded the Fed and the 
courts to allow bank holding companies to establish Section 20 
subsidiaries that could underwrite and trade bank-ineligible 
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securities.401  
Lewis Preston, who led JPMC during the 1980s, was determined 
to remove Glass-Steagall’s barriers so that JPMC could establish a 
major investment banking presence in the United States as well as 
foreign markets. 402   In 1984, Preston instructed JPMC’s staff to 
produce an extensive critique of Glass-Steagall, entitled Rethinking 
Glass-Steagall.403  Alan Greenspan was then a director of JPMC, and 
he was “very instrumental in getting that document out.”404  JPMC 
continued to play a prominent role in the attack on Glass-Steagall 
under the leadership of Preston’s successor, Dennis Weatherstone.405   
Along with Walter Wriston, Alan Greenspan was one of the 
strongest opponents of Glass-Steagall.  Like Wriston, Greenspan had a 
deep aversion to government regulation and the New Deal. 406  
Greenspan was a close friend and follower of Ayn Rand from the early 
1950s until her death in 1981, and he shared her libertarian philosophy 
and unwavering belief in laissez-faire capitalism.407  During the 1960s, 
Greenspan “wrote several essays for the [Ayn] Rand publication, The 
Objectivist,” in which he “criticized both consumer protection and 
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antitrust laws because they interfered with the free market.” 408  
Greenspan considered Rand “a stabilizing force” in his life, and she 
stood at his side when he took the oath of office as Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers in 1974.409   
Greenspan granted an interview to the New York Times in June 
1987, shortly before he was nominated by President Reagan to 
succeed Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Fed.410  In that interview, 
Greenspan advocated unrestricted nationwide banking, the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall, and the removal of BHCA’s barriers to acquisitions of 
banks by commercial and industrial firms.411  Greenspan’s positions 
were identical to policy proposals that Treasury Under Secretary 
George Gould announced in the same news article. 412   In sharp 
contrast to Paul Volcker – who said in 1984 that he was concerned 
about a “rush to deregulation” that could produce an “undue 
concentration of banking resources”413 – Greenspan assured the Times, 
“I do not have a fear of undue concentration of banking powers.”414   
In December 1987, Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee 
that the Fed strongly supported a deregulation bill drafted by Senators 
William Proxmire (D-WI) and Jake Garn (R-UT).415  The Proxmire-
Garn bill would have repealed Glass-Steagall’s anti-affiliation 
provisions and allowed bank holding companies to establish securities 
subsidiaries that could engage in a full range of securities activities.416  
Greenspan praised the Proxmire-Garn bill for addressing “what is 
perhaps the single most important anomaly that now plagues our 
financial system—the artificial separation of commercial and 
investment banking.” 417   Greenspan advised the Committee that 
“repeal of Glass-Steagall would provide significant public benefits 
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consistent with a manageable increase in risk.”418   
Greenspan acknowledged that “securities activities are clearly 
risky,” as demonstrated by “the unprecedented decline in the stock 
market that occurred on October 19, 1987, and the subsequent market 
volatility.”419  However, he assured the Committee that “potential risks 
from securities activities can be effectively managed.”420   
Greenspan also admitted that “some large U.S. banks encountered 
problems” and suffered losses in their London operations during the 
U.K.’s “secondary banking crisis” in the mid-1970s and again in 1986, 
after the U.K. carried out its “big bang” deregulation of the London 
Stock Exchange.421  Greenspan dismissed those problems as “‘start-
up’ difficulties rather than long-term safety and soundness 
concerns.”422  Greenspan recognized that “empirical studies invariably 
find that [securities] underwriting and dealing are riskier than the total 
portfolio of other banking functions.”423   However, he maintained, 
“there is evidence of some potential for limited diversification gains, 
or overall risk reduction, for banks being allowed increased securities 
powers.”424   
Greenspan plainly understood that banks would face significant 
risks if they made a full-scale entry into the securities business.425  
However, he advised the Senate Banking Committee that banks could 
be “effectively insulated from their securities affiliates through an 
appropriate structural framework” that included “institutional fire 
walls.”426  In his view, “one of the most important” firewalls in the 
Proxmire-Garn bill was a provision that would prohibit a bank from 
“being able to lend to, or purchase assets from, its securities 
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affiliate.” 427   He believed that a “straightforward prohibition on 
lending to securities affiliates” was needed to “limit the transfer of the 
risk of the securities activities to the federal safety net.”428   
Greenspan emphasized the importance of a no-credit firewall in his 
1987 testimony because he recognized that existing limitations on 
transactions between banks and their nonbank affiliates would not 
contain the risks resulting from affiliations with securities firms.429  As 
he explained, “Our experience indicates . . . that these limitations, 
embodied in sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, do not 
work as effectively as we would like and, because of their complexity, 
are subject to avoidance by creative interpretation, particularly in 
times of stress.”430  Thus, Greenspan recognized that (i) a repeal of 
Glass-Steagall could enable banks to transfer their federal safety-net 
subsidies and resulting cost-of-funding advantages to their securities 
affiliates through extensions of credit and purchases of assets, and (ii) 
Sections 23A and 23B would not be adequate to control such transfers 
of subsidies.431   
Greenspan’s insistence on strict firewalls to prevent transfers of 
safety-net subsidies proved to be short-lived.  In May 1990, a coalition 
of big banks and supporting trade groups issued a report contending 
that legislation to repeal Glass-Steagall should not include additional 
“firewalls” between banks and their securities affiliates.432  The big-
bank coalition argued that existing laws, including Sections 23A and 
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23B of the Federal Reserve Act, would be sufficient to prevent 
conflicts of interest and other adverse effects of bank affiliations with 
securities firms.433   
Greenspan quickly fell into line with the big-bank coalition’s 
arguments.  In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in July 
1990, Greenspan stated that the Fed was “reevaluating both the 
efficacy and desirability of substantial fire walls” between banks and 
their securities affiliates. 434   He gave two reasons for the Fed’s 
reassessment.  First, the failure of Drexel Burnham in early 1990 
“raised serious questions about the ability of fire walls to insulate one 
unit of a holding company from funding problems of another.”435  The 
insolvency of Drexel’s holding company quickly led to creditor runs 
on Drexel’s broker-dealer subsidiaries and forced those subsidiaries 
into receivership.436  Second, Greenspan was concerned that “high and 
thick fire walls reduce synergies and raise costs for financial 
institutions, a significant problem in increasingly competitive financial 
markets.”437   
It is ironic, to say the least, that Greenspan used the Drexel 
episode—when firewalls failed—to argue for weaker firewalls 
between banks and their securities affiliates.  It also seems clear that 
Greenspan, like the big banks, wanted to eliminate strong firewalls in 
order to increase the potential value of expected synergies between 
banks and their securities affiliates.  In his 1990 testimony, Greenspan 
advised Congress that “more limited fire walls,” such as the existing 
provisions of Sections 23A and 23B, would be sufficient as long as 
Congress allowed federal regulators to impose higher capital 
requirements and stricter regulatory standards on bank holding 
companies that owned broker-dealer subsidiaries. 438   Greenspan 
argued that stronger capital requirements and supervisory standards 
would “go a long way to limit the transference of bank safety net 
subsidies to bank affiliates.”439   
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The banking industry responded with great enthusiasm to 
Greenspan’s testimony.  Representatives of big-bank trade 
associations hailed Greenspan’s statement as “a bold and ingenious 
stroke” and “a refreshing insight” because he recognized that a “strict-
firewalls approach” would be an “obstacle to efficiency in product and 
service integration.” 440   Other observers agreed that Greenspan’s 
testimony “effectively undermined the firewall concept.”441   
Greenspan’s testimony in 1987 and 1990 should be remembered in 
the context of GLBA’s final terms and the massive bailouts of 
financial holding companies during 2007–09. 442   Greenspan 
recognized in both 1987 and 1990 that banks would have strong 
incentives to transfer their safety-net subsidies to their securities 
affiliates.443  Greenspan’s 1987 testimony highlighted the importance 
of strong firewalls (including a no-transfer-of-credit rule) to prevent 
the spread of subsidies.444  In contrast, his 1990 testimony focused on 
the need for high levels of capital and strong supervisory standards if 
strong firewalls were not imposed.445  As discussed below, GLBA 
relied primarily on Sections 23A and 23B to prevent the spread of 
safety net subsidies.  In addition, Greenspan and the Fed granted 
frequent waivers of Section 23A and did not impose stringent capital 
requirements or tough regulatory standards on large diversified 
banks.446  The weak terms of GLBA and the lax regulatory policies of 
Greenspan’s Fed resulted in a massive and costly expansion of the 
federal safety net during the decade after GLBA’s passage.447   
Congress did not pass the Proxmire-Garn bill in 1987 or 1988448, 
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just as it failed to pass an earlier Senate bill sponsored by Senator 
Garn in 1984. 449   On each occasion, the securities and insurance 
industries and independent community banks worked together to 
prevent a repeal of Glass-Steagall, and they received significant help 
from influential Democratic members of Congress.450  One of the most 
determined and effective defenders of Glass-Steagall was Rep. John 
Dingell (D-MI), whose father strongly supported passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act as a Michigan congressman 1933.451   
After the stock market crashed in October 1987, the securities 
industry pointed out that Glass-Steagall played a highly beneficial role 
by preventing a contagious spillover of losses from securities firms to 
commercial banks.452  In addition, big-bank advocates were severely 
embarrassed when Continental Illinois – which received a large 
federal bailout in 1984 – extended more than $600 million of 
emergency loans to rescue its options trading subsidiary (First 
Options) during the crash.453  Continental’s emergency loans exceeded 
the lending limit that the OCC established when it allowed Continental 
to acquire First Options in 1986.454  Members of Congress strongly 
criticized Continental, and the First Options fiasco helped to defeat the 
banking industry’s campaign to repeal Glass-Steagall in 1987 and 
1988.455   
The largest banks persisted in their efforts to remove geographic 
and product-line barriers, and they soon received fresh support from 
the federal government.456  In 1991, the Treasury Department issued a 
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blueprint for comprehensive deregulation, entitled Modernizing the 
Financial System. 457   The Treasury plan contained the same three 
proposals that Treasury Under Secretary George Gould floated in 1987 
– nationwide banking and branching, the repeal of Glass-Steagall, and 
the removal of barriers to acquisitions of banks by commercial and 
industrial firms. 458   As described below in Part III.B. and III.C., 
Congress enacted Treasury’s first two proposals and thereby paved the 
way for the creation of giant financial conglomerates that stretched 
across the nation and spanned all sectors of the financial industry.   
B.? In 1994, Congress Passed the Riegle-Neal Act, Which Adopted 
Treasury’s 1991 Proposal for Nationwide Banking and 
Branching 
 
The first key proposal of the 1991 Treasury deregulation plan was 
to authorize unrestricted nationwide banking through interstate 
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies as well as interstate 
branching. 459   Treasury urged Congress to repeal Section 3(d) of 
BHCA, which allowed each state to determine the degree to which 
out-of-state bank holding companies could acquire banks within its 
borders.460  Beginning in 1975, states began to permit entry by out-of-
state bank holding companies.461  By 1991, thirty-four states allowed 
entry by bank holding companies located anywhere in the nation, 
subject to reciprocity requirements in twenty-two states.462  Fourteen 
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other states allowed entry by out-of-state bank holding companies only 
if their home states were located in a defined geographical region and 
offered reciprocal access.463  Treasury’s plan called for a new federal 
statute that would remove all federal and state barriers to interstate 
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies.464   
Treasury also proposed an amendment to the McFadden Act (12 
U.S.C. § 36), which would authorize national banks to establish 
branches on a nationwide basis either by merging with banks in other 
states or by opening de novo branches across state lines. 465   This 
proposal represented a more radical change to existing law, because in 
1991 the McFadden Act barred national banks and state member banks 
from opening branches across state lines.466   
The Treasury plan argued that nationwide banking and branching 
would create stronger and safer banks through geographic 
diversification.467  The plan also contended that nationwide banking 
and branching would create a more efficient, competitive and 
profitable banking industry and would provide greater convenience to 
bank customers, including large corporations, residents of multistate 
urban areas, and travelers.468  The plan did not specifically promote 
the idea of nationwide megabanks.469  However, as I argued in a 1992 
article, the plan clearly indicated Treasury’s support for “a rapid 
consolidation of most of the banking industry into a small number of 
large nationwide banks.”470   
In the same article, I maintained that nationwide banking and 
branching would present serious potential risks to the U.S. financial 
system and economy for several reasons. 471   First, while large, 
geographically diversified banks might face lower risks of failure due 
to local or regional economic downturns, mergers between large banks 
would encounter significant challenges as a result of culture clashes 
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and incompatible risk profiles.472  During the 1980s stronger banks 
often experienced severe difficulties after absorbing weaker 
institutions, because losses and other problems from acquired 
institutions infected the combined organizations.473  Second, it was 
very doubtful whether executives could successfully identify and 
control the wide range of risks presented by complex financial 
giants.474  Third, Treasury’s assertion that larger size would confer 
greater safety was contradicted by the fact that many large banks 
performed poorly during the 1980s and early 1990s.475  Eleven of the 
fifty largest U.S. banks either failed or required federal bailouts during 
that period.476  Fourth, empirical studies raised serious doubts about 
the claimed efficiency advantages of the largest banks, and many 
consumers and small businesses were not happy with the services 
provided and fees charged by big banks.477  Fifth, nationwide banks 
would present significant threats to competition in many markets for 
banking services, and antitrust laws were not likely to be effective in 
controlling those threats.478   
Sixth, and most importantly, I argued that nationwide banking and 
branching would make the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) problem much 
worse by creating giant banks whose potential failures would pose 
much greater systemic threats to the U.S. banking system.479  Federal 
regulators invoked the TBTF rationale when they bailed out several 
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large regional banks during the banking crisis of the 1980s and early 
1990s, including Continental Illinois in 1984, First RepublicBank in 
1988, and Bank of New England in 1991.480  Regulators protected 
those banks and their uninsured creditors to avoid the possibility of 
triggering creditor runs on big money center banks that faced severe 
threats to their survival.481  James Barth, Dan Brumbaugh, and Robert 
Litan determined that “the largest banks, as a group, pose[d] the 
greatest risk to the FDIC” in 1990, and they identified several money 
center banks — including Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Chemical, and 
Manufacturers Hanover — as institutions that had inadequate loan loss 
reserves and “very thin capital margins” at that time. 482   Federal 
regulators provided extensive forbearance and implicit support to 
Citicorp, the largest U.S. bank, which was severely undercapitalized 
and struggled with multiple problems during the late 1980s and early 
1990s.483   
In light of the grave threats that large U.S. banks faced during the 
1980s and early 1990s, it was not surprising that the 1991 Treasury 
plan did not seek to abolish the TBTF policy.484  Instead, the Treasury 
plan recommended that the TBTF policy should be codified by 
incorporating a new “systemic risk exception” into federal law. 485  
That “exception” would allow Treasury and the Fed to determine 
jointly that uninsured depositors of a failing bank should be protected 
in order to prevent “systemic risk.” 486   To justify the proposed 
codification of TBTF, Treasury cited the “most recent example” of 
protecting uninsured depositors at the Bank of New England, and 
Treasury also declared: “The government must always maintain the 
flexibility to protect the banking system and the economy in 
circumstances of genuine systemic risk.”487   
In December 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), 488  which expanded the 
supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers of federal banking 
                                                                                                                                             
480 Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 989, 993–94; FDIC HISTORY, 
supra note 394, at 235–36, 243–52, 373–78.  
481 Id.; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2010), supra note 430, at 6–10. 
482 BARTH, supra note 476, at 115, 32, 41–44, 54–56. 
483 Wilmarth, Too Good to Be True, supra note 476, at 44–45 n.210. BARTH, 
supra note 476, at 32, 41, 54–56.  
484 Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 996. 
485 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 60, at 27. 
486 Id.  
487 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
488 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. Chapter 16); See 
Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 47, at 979 (discussing FDICIA). 
? 
????? ??????????????????? ????
regulators.  As proposed by the Treasury plan, FDICIA requires 
regulators to follow “prompt corrective action” and “early resolution” 
policies.489  Those policies are designed to force regulators to impose 
strict sanctions on undercapitalized banks and to close weak banks 
before they become insolvent.490   
FDICIA also requires the FDIC to use the least costly method for 
resolving bank failures.491  The “least-cost test,” which was included 
in the Treasury plan, is intended to stop the FDIC from protecting 
uninsured depositors in most failed banks. 492   However, as the 
Treasury plan recommended, FDICIA includes a “systemic risk 
exception” to the least-cost test.493  Under that exception, the Fed, 
FDIC and Treasury may jointly decide to protect uninsured creditors 
of a failed bank to “avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on 
economic conditions or financial stability.”494  Thus, as I pointed out 
in my 1992 article, FDICIA “for the first time provide[d] a clear 
statutory basis for the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine."495   
FDICIA also contained a second significant expansion of the 
federal safety net, which directly benefited securities firms and other 
nonbanks.  Section 473 of FDICIA amended Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act by authorizing the Fed to provide emergency 
loans to nonbanks secured by almost any type of collateral that the Fed 
deemed to be satisfactory, including securities and other types of 
financial instruments. 496   Prior to 1991, the Fed could not accept 
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securities as collateral for loans under Section 13(3).497   Goldman 
Sachs and other large securities firms lobbied for the amendment 
because of concerns created by the Fed’s failure to rescue Drexel 
Burnham from bankruptcy in 1990.498  Senator Christopher Dodd (D-
CT) sponsored the amendment to Section 13(3), and he explained that 
the amendment would permit the Fed “to make fully secured loans to 
securities firms in instances similar to the 1987 stock market crash.”499   
In 2008, the Fed relied on its expanded lending authority under 
Section 13(3) to provide massive amounts of financial support to large 
securities firms — including securities broker-dealers that were 
affiliates of major banks — as well as AIG and other nonbanks.500  
Morgan Ricks has suggested (and I agree) that FDICIA’s grant of 
“lender of last resort” authority to the Fed with regard to securities 
firms was a significant factor that encouraged the explosive growth of 
securities broker-dealers and their non-deposit liabilities (including 
commercial paper and repos) after 1991.501    
FDICIA did not include Treasury’s proposal for nationwide 
banking and branching. 502   Community banks and their allies 
successfully defeated efforts by the George H.W. Bush Administration 
and big banks to incorporate that proposal in the 1991 legislation.503  
As a result, Treasury’s interstate banking recommendation remained 
an active agenda item when the Clinton Administration took office in 
early 1993.504   
 The Clinton Administration submitted an interstate banking bill to 
Congress in October 1993.505  Administration officials worked closely 
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with the big-bank lobby to secure passage of Riegle-Neal in 
September 1994.506  Riegle-Neal authorized nationwide banking and 
branching, as the Treasury plan recommended.507  Community banks 
and consumer groups could not stop the legislation after the insurance 
industry saw “passage as inevitable, [and] dropped its opposition.”508  
When President Clinton signed Riegle-Neal into law, he declared, 
“Our work is far from over,” and he promised to push Congress to 
approve further deregulation of the financial industry.509   
Riegle-Neal greatly accelerated a wave of consolidation that was 
already sweeping through the banking industry.  In 1995, big banks 
announced nine mergers that ranked among the fourteen largest U.S. 
bank mergers up to that time. 510   Seventy-four “megamergers” 
occurred between 1990 and 2005 in which both the acquiring and 
acquired banks held more than $10 billion of assets.511  During the 
same period, the ten largest U.S. banks more than doubled their share 
of total U.S. banking assets from twenty-five percent to fifty-five 
percent.512  The three largest U.S. banking organizations in 2007 — 
Citigroup, BofA, and JPMC — expanded rapidly after 1990, and each 
bank held more than $1.5 billion of assets at the end of 2007.513  
Wachovia, the fourth-largest bank, also grew quickly and held almost 
$800 billion of assets at the end of 2007.514   
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The consolidation trend transformed the U.S. banking industry into 
a two-tiered structure with a “barbell” shape.515  A small group of 
giant megabanks occupied the top end of the barbell, and they 
controlled a substantial majority of the banking industry’s assets.516  
Several thousand smaller, community-oriented banks were clustered at 
the lower end of the barbell, and their share of the industry’s assets 
steadily declined.517  As the largest banks exploded in size, they also 
achieved unprecedented political clout, as they showed when they 
convinced Congress to pass GLBA and CFMA.518   
C.? In 1999, Congress Passed GLBA, Which Adopted the 
Treasury’s 1991 Proposal to Authorize Full-Scale Affiliations 
between Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies 
 
The second central component of the 1991 Treasury deregulation 
plan was its proposal to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-
affiliation rules and to authorize financial holding companies that 
could own banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.519  The 
Treasury plan argued that unrestricted affiliations between banks and 
other providers of financial services would create “a stronger, more 
diversified financial system that will provide important benefits to the 
consumer” and respond effectively to “market innovation.”520   
Treasury’s 1991 report acknowledged that federal agency rulings 
already permitted banks and bank holding companies to engage “in a 
broad range of securities activities,” including securitization of loans 
as well as underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities 
through Section 20 subsidiaries.521  However, those agency rulings 
imposed “numerous restrictions,” such as “strict ‘firewall’ 
requirements” that imposed significant constraints on transactions 
between banks and their securities affiliates.522  In Treasury’s view, 
the deregulation achieved through agency rulings was seriously flawed 
and incomplete because it had proceeded in “a piecemeal, inefficient, 
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and often irrational manner.” 523   
Treasury’s 1991 report called on Congress to allow banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies to establish full-scale 
affiliations under the common ownership of financial holding 
companies, “so that natural synergies c[ould] be realized.”524  Treasury 
predicted that businesses and consumers would benefit from “more 
financial vendors offering a greater variety of products at 
competitively lower prices.” 525   In addition, financial holding 
companies would produce “a more stable stream of income,” thereby 
enhancing “the overall stability of financial markets.”526   
Treasury’s report recognized that the “federal safety net cannot be 
extended to [nonbank affiliates] without eroding market discipline, 
exposing the taxpayer to additional losses, and unfairly subsidizing the 
activities of financial affiliates.” 527   The report acknowledged that 
transfers of funds from a bank to its nonbank affiliates could produce a 
situation in which (i) the federal safety net was “exposed to losses 
from affiliates” and (ii) the “bank’s funding advantages from the 
safety net could ‘leak’ into affiliated financial activities.”528  Treasury, 
therefore, recommended the use of “firewalls” to separate banks from 
their nonbank affiliates.529   
Treasury argued, however, that firewalls “should be kept to the 
minimum necessary to protect insured deposits and prevent [an] unfair 
funding subsidy,” and firewalls “should not restrict or impede 
operational, managerial, or marketing synergies between a bank and 
its financial affiliates.”530  In line with Greenspan’s 1990 testimony, 
Treasury’s 1991 report advised that the existing limits on affiliate 
transactions under Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 
would be sufficient, particularly if regulators were given authority to 
impose additional “discretionary” restrictions on affiliate 
transactions.531   
FDICIA did not include Treasury’s financial holding company 
proposal.532  The House Banking Committee incorporated much of 
Treasury’s proposal into its bill, but the House Energy and Commerce 
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Committee, led by Representative Dingell, imposed very strict limits 
on the securities and insurance activities that would be permissible for 
nonbank affiliates of banks. 533   The resulting House bill was 
unacceptable to both Treasury and the big banks, and they abandoned 
their efforts to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-affiliation 
rules in November 1991.534  The insurance industry and community 
banks worked together to stop the repeal legislation, while the 
securities industry was ambivalent and did little to support it.535   
Big banks and their political allies focused on interstate banking 
legislation until Congress passed Riegle-Neal in September 1994.536  
In early 1995, the big-bank lobby launched a new campaign to pass 
“financial modernization” legislation that would tear down Glass-
Steagall’s and BHCA’s structural barriers.537  Prospects for passage 
seemed favorable after Republicans captured control of the House in 
the 1994 midterm elections, and after Representative Dingell lost his 
blocking position as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee.538  However, the insurance industry and community banks 
succeeded in blocking financial modernization bills during 1995 and 
1996.539   
Congress also failed to pass financial modernization legislation in 
1997 and 1998, but two major events occurred during those years that 
shifted the political landscape in favor of financial deregulation.540  
First, after repeatedly losing legal challenges to federal agency rulings, 
large securities firms and insurance underwriters decided to join the 
big banks in pushing for repeal of Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-
affiliation rules. 541   Securities firms and insurance underwriters 
endorsed the financial holding company concept because it created a 
“two-way street” that would enable them to conduct banking activities 
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on equal terms with bank holding companies.542  The shift of securities 
firms and insurance underwriters to the pro-repeal side left insurance 
agents and community banks as the only major trade groups that 
opposed repeal.543    
The second decisive event occurred in April 1998, when Travelers 
and Citicorp announced their decision to merge under the name of 
“Citigroup,” thereby creating the world’s biggest financial 
institution. 544   Travelers was a major insurance company that 
controlled a large securities broker-dealer (Salomon Brothers), while 
Citicorp was the largest U.S. bank holding company.545  The Citigroup 
merger created the first “universal bank” that could offer 
comprehensive banking, securities, and insurance services in the 
United States since the 1930s.546   
Citigroup’s co-leaders — Sanford (Sandy) Weill of Travelers and 
John Reed of Citicorp — declared that their new financial 
conglomerate would offer unparalleled convenience to their customers 
through “one-stop shopping” for a wide range of banking, securities, 
and insurance services.547  They also argued that Citigroup would have 
a superior ability to withstand financial shocks due to its broadly 
diversified activities.548  Sandy Weill proclaimed, “We are creating a 
model financial institution of the future. . . . In a world that’s changing 
very rapidly, we will be able to withstand the storms.” 549   Thus, 
Citigroup’s founders cited the same anticipated benefits of universal 
banking that the 1991 Treasury report had trumpeted.   
The creation of Citigroup was a very aggressive move that placed 
intense pressure on Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s 
structural barriers.  The proposed merger “challenge[d] both the 
statutory letter and regulatory spirit” of Glass-Steagall and BHCA.550  
The sole source of statutory authority for the merger was “a temporary 
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exemption in [BHCA], which allowed newly-formed bank holding 
companies to retain nonconforming assets for up to five years after 
their creation.” 551   However, as a banking lawyer noted, that 
temporary exemption was “intended to provide an orderly mechanism 
for disposing of impermissible activities, not warehousing them in 
hopes the law would change so you could keep them.”552   
The Citigroup merger confronted Congress with a “Hobson’s 
choice” — either repeal Glass-Steagall's and BHCA's anti-affiliation 
rules or force Citigroup, within five years, to divest all of its activities 
that were not permitted by Glass-Steagall and BHCA.553  In blunter 
terms, the Citigroup deal put a gun to the head of Congress, and it did 
so with the full blessing of top government officials.  Sandy Weill and 
John Reed consulted with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury 
Secretary Robert Rubin, and President Clinton before they announced 
the Citigroup merger.554  All three officials endorsed the merger.555  
Based on those advance consultations, Reed told the press that 
Travelers and Citicorp were confident “there wasn’t a legal problem” 
in completing the merger.556  The Fed approved the merger in due 
course, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the Fed’s approval.557   
The “advance clearance” that Travelers and Citicorp received from 
Clinton, Greenspan, and Rubin was “extraordinary” and, to my 
knowledge, unprecedented. 558   The kid-gloves treatment that 
government leaders provided to Travelers and Citicorp demonstrated 
the “powerful influence” that big banks and Wall Street firms could 
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wield in their dealings with politicians and regulators.559   As Jeff 
Madrick observed, the advance blessing for Citigroup provided “a 
stark example of the ease with which the powerful on Wall Street got 
the ear of key policymakers, and also how easily the Fed, through its 
rulings, could bypass the intentions of Congress.”560   For his part, 
Greenspan assured Reed and Weill, “I have nothing against size . . . 
[i]t doesn’t bother me at all.”561   
  
 ********************************************  
 
Citigroup and Weill promptly became the leading private-sector 
champions for repeal of the remaining obstacles to universal banking.  
Big banks, securities firms, and insurance companies joined with 
Citigroup in financing a campaign for GLBA’s passage that spent 
more than $300 million on lobbying and political campaign 
contributions.562  Greenspan and Rubin eagerly supported the financial 
industry’s efforts to get rid of the legal obstacles to universal 
banking.563  Greenspan argued that Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-
affiliation rules forced financial institutions “to take elaborate steps to 
develop and deliver new financial products in a manner that is . . . 
increasingly burdensome and serve[s] no useful public purpose.”564  In 
Greenspan’s view, those “archaic statutory barriers” threatened to 
“undermine the global dominance of American finance, as well as the 
continued competitiveness of our financial institutions.”565  He also 
hailed the benefits of “one-stop shopping” that universal banking 
would offer to businesses and consumers.566   
Rubin similarly contended that an increasing “convergence” 
between the business models of large banks and securities firms made 
“any legal separation of commercial and investment banking 
increasingly awkward and artificial.” 567   He warned Congress that 
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Glass-Steagall and BHCA imposed “unnecessary costs on the financial 
system” and could “conceivably impede safety and soundness by 
limiting revenue diversification.” 568   Rubin was confident that 
universal banks would provide “more integrated, convenient financial 
services to consumers and communities.”569  He acknowledged “the 
legitimacy of the concerns that led to [the] enactment of Glass-
Steagall.” 570   However, he believed those concerns could be 
“adequately addressed” by Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal 
Reserve Act as well as strong capital and regulatory standards.571   
Thus, Greenspan, Rubin, and the Clinton Administration 
enthusiastically embraced the perceived benefits of universal banking 
and worked hard to repeal Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s anti-
affiliation rules.  Rubin was a former co-chief executive of Goldman 
Sachs, and he maintained an extensive network of relationships with 
leaders of major banks and securities firms. 572   President Clinton 
maintained close friendships with leading financiers (including Sandy 
Weill and Hugh McColl), and he welcomed the political contributions 
his campaigns received from big banks, Wall Street firms, and their 
trade associations.573  In May 1996, Clinton was the featured guest at a 
political fundraising event for leading bankers, which was held at the 
White House and hosted by the Democratic National Committee.574  
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Top executives from several of the nation’s largest banks attended the 
fund-raiser, along with Clinton, Rubin, other senior Treasury officials, 
and Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig (the senior regulator 
of national banks).575  The event included a discussion of strategies for 
repealing Glass-Steagall.576   
Congress approved GLBA in November 1999, due in large part to 
the Clinton Administration’s strong backing as well as the unified 
support of big banks, securities firms, and insurance underwriters.577  
Insurance agents and community banks strongly opposed the 
legislation, and Republicans and Democrats disagreed over the 
standards that financial holding companies should be required to 
satisfy under the Community Reinvestment Act.578  As a result, final 
passage of GLBA did not come easily.579   
In October 1999, Citigroup hired Robert Rubin as its new co-
chairman in the midst of prolonged political and financial debates over 
GLBA.580  Rubin’s stature as a former Treasury Secretary provided a 
“highly visible public endorsement” for Citigroup’s campaign to 
repeal Glass-Steagall.581  A few weeks later, when final negotiations 
on GLBA “appeared to reach an impasse,” Senator Phil Gramm (R-
TX) arranged for Sandy Weill “to help broker a last-minute 
compromise between Republican congressional leaders and the 
Clinton Administration, thereby securing [GLBA’s] passage.”582   
During the congressional debates over GLBA, supporters of the 
legislation repeated the claims previously made by the 1991 Treasury 
report — and by Greenspan and Rubin — that the new financial 
holding companies would (i) “earn higher profits based on favorable 
economies of scale and scope,” (ii) “achieve greater safety by 
diversifying their activities,” (iii) offer “one-stop shopping” that would 
provide “increased convenience and lower costs for businesses and 
consumers,” and (iv) “compete with foreign universal banks” more 
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effectively.583  GLBA’s supporters also argued that the legislation was 
needed to sweep away the “inefficient and costly” and potentially 
“unstable” loopholes that federal agency rulings had created, and to 
replace those loopholes with a clear, definitive legal framework 
authorizing full-scale affiliations between banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies.584   
When he signed GLBA into law, President Clinton declared, “This 
is a very good day for the United States. . . . [W]e have done right by 
the American people and . . . we have increased the chances of making 
the next century an American century.”585  At the signing ceremony, 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers similarly proclaimed, “With 
this bill, the American financial system takes a major step forward 
towards the 21st century. . . . I believe we have found the right 
framework for America’s future financial system.”586   
Phil Gramm, whose free-market zeal matched Greenspan’s, 
boasted at the signing ceremony that GLBA was “a deregulatory 
bill.”587  Gramm noted that “when Glass-Steagall became law, it was 
believed that government was the answer. . . . We are here to repeal 
Glass-Steagall because we have learned that government is not the 
answer.”588  A few months after GLBA’s passage, Gramm described 
Wall Street as “the very nerve center of American capitalism . . . to 
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me, that’s a holy place.”589   
In contrast to the rosy predictions of GLBA’s supporters, GLBA’s 
opponents argued that “the new universal banks permitted by GLBA 
were likely to generate financial risks and speculative excesses similar 
to those that occurred during the 1920s.”590  Opponents contended that 
regulators would almost certainly protect the new universal banks as 
institutions that were TBTF.591  Opponents also warned that “removal 
of Glass-Steagall’s constraints might ultimately cause a financial crisis 
similar in magnitude to the Great Depression.”592   
 
 ******************************************** 
  
GLBA’s supporters acknowledged that GLBA should protect the 
federal safety net from the potential risks of securities and insurance 
activities, and should also prevent banks from transferring their safety-
net subsidies to their securities and insurance affiliates. 593   To 
accomplish those goals, GLBA relied primarily on “firewalls” 
resulting from (i) the separate corporate identities of banks and their 
nonbank affiliates, and (ii) the restrictions on affiliate transactions 
under Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.594  However, 
as Joseph Stiglitz subsequently explained, the firewall arguments of 
GLBA’s supporters relied on “an obvious intellectual 
inconsistency.”595  If insured banks and the federal safety net needed 
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to be shielded from the risks posed by securities and insurance 
affiliates, “what were the benefits of integration?”596  If, on the other 
hand, Congress established only weak “Chinese walls” in order to 
promote desirable “economies of scope” across financial holding 
companies, that approach would obviously increase the risks to the 
FDIC and taxpayers and would also enable banks to transfer safety-net 
subsidies to their affiliates.597   
In 1995, Paul Volcker warned Congress that regulators would 
probably be forced to extend the federal safety net to protect large 
securities firms if they were allowed to affiliate with large banks.598  In 
testimony before the House Banking Committee, Volcker said: 
[I]t is obvious that if you had a large investment bank 
allied with a large [commercial] bank, the possibility of 
a systemic risk arising is evident. . . .  It may be even 
evident with the investment bank alone.  We are trying 
to keep them out of the so-called safety net now, but 
certainly you cannot keep them out if they are 
combined with a banking institution.599  
GLBA’s supporters ignored Stigler’s paradox and Volcker’s 
warning, and Congress adopted the “limited” firewall approach, as 
Greenspan and Rubin had advocated.600   In contrast, Senator Paul 
Wellstone (D-MN), a strong opponent of GLBA, warned that the 
firewalls remaining after Glass-Steagall’s repeal would be “weak” and 
would probably disappear during a future financial crisis. 601  
Wellstone pointed out that Glass-Steagall was “one of several 
stabilizers” designed to prevent a second Great Depression, and GLBA 
would “repeal that stabilizer without putting any comparable safeguard 
in place.”602 
Saule Omarova has shown just how porous and ineffective the 
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Section 23A firewall proved to be.603  Section 23A is not an absolute 
barrier to the transfer of safety-net subsidies because it permits banks 
to transfer some of their cost-of-funding advantages to their 
affiliates.604  Under Section 23A, a bank may extend credit to, and 
may purchase assets from, its nonbank affiliates as long as the bank 
complies with specified quantitative limits, collateral requirements, 
and qualitative conditions.605  The scope of Section 23A is limited by a 
number of statutory exemptions, which provide interpretive challenges 
and opportunities for arbitrage. 606   In addition, the Fed possessed 
broad, unilateral, authority to waive Section 23A’s requirements until 
2010.607  Thus, as Alan Greenspan admitted in his 1987 testimony, the 
“complexity” of Sections 23A and 23B made both statutes vulnerable 
“to avoidance by creative interpretation, particularly in times of 
stress.”608   
The first acid test of the post-GLBA firewalls occurred during the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.609  
When the attacks threatened to disrupt financial markets on Wall 
Street, the Fed flooded the financial markets with liquidity by 
purchasing $150 billion of government securities and by extending 
more than $45 billion of discount window loans to banks.610  The Fed 
also “suspended” Section 23A’s limits on affiliate transactions and 
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“urged major banks to make large transfers of funds to their securities 
affiliates.”611  In my 2002 article, I suggested that the Fed’s Section 
23A waivers on 9/11 indicated that “the [Fed] views the survival of 
major financial conglomerates as an indispensable element of its 
broader mission to preserve market stability.  Market participants 
therefore have strong reasons to expect that the TBTF policy will be 
applied to all important subsidiaries of leading financial holding 
companies.”612   
As Saule Omarova has shown, the Fed subsequently acted in 
precisely the way I anticipated in 2002.  The Fed repeatedly waived 
Section 23A’s restrictions to assist large financial institutions as they 
expanded and consolidated their operations between 2000 and 2007.613  
The Fed granted even broader waivers of Section 23A’s limitations 
after the financial crisis began in mid-2007, so that major banks could 
rescue their threatened securities affiliates and MMMFs.614  The Fed’s 
extraordinary waivers after mid-2007 permitted “massive transfers of 
funds” from large banks to their nonbank affiliates in ways that 
“purposely exposed banks to risks associated with their affiliates’ 
nonbanking business and transferred [the] federal subsidy outside the 
[banking] system.”615   
The Fed’s large-scale waivers of Section 23A after the financial 
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crisis broke out were part of a comprehensive series of rescue 
measures that bailed out large financial conglomerates in the banking, 
securities, and insurance sectors.616  Those bailouts “turned to ashes” 
the promises made by Citigroup’s founders – and by GLBA’s 
supporters – that Glass-Steagall’s repeal would usher in a new era of 
greater economic prosperity and financial stability while avoiding any 
extension of the federal safety net beyond the traditional banking 
system.617  GLBA’s opponents proved to be highly prescient when 
they  warned that TBTF bailouts of large financial conglomerates 
would almost certainly occur if Congress repealed Glass-Steagall.  On 
the evening when the House of Representatives passed GLBA, 
Congressman Dingell declared: 
[W]hat we are creating now is a group of institutions 
which are too big to fail. . . . Taxpayers are going to be 
called upon to cure the failures we are creating tonight, 
and it is going to cost a lot of money, and it is coming.  
Just be prepared for those events.618 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, two leading proponents of 
universal banking admitted that TBTF bailouts were the price that 
society must pay to secure the elusive benefits of global universal 
banks.  In a private interview, Robert Rubin stated: “Too big to fail 
isn’t a problem with the system.  It is the system.  You can’t be a 
competitive global financial institution serving global corporations of 
scale without having a certain scale yourself.  The bigger 
multinationals get, the bigger financial institutions will have to get.”619 
In testimony before a House of Lords subcommittee in 2014, 
HSBC chairman Douglas Flint acknowledged that universal banks 
received an “implicit subsidy” during the financial crisis. 620   The 
public “subsidy” for universal banks resulted from the fact that 
“investment banking operations were alongside society’s deposits, 
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[and] there was an implicit underwriting of the debt within the 
[combined] operation because one would not risk the systemic panic 
that would happen if people thought their deposits were at risk.”621  
According to Flint, that “subsidy” is an inevitable charge that 
“society” must pay to maintain a financial system that includes large 
universal banks: “At the end of the day, the burden of failure [of a 
universal bank] rests with society.  Whether you take it out of 
society’s future income through taxation or whether you take it out 
through their pensions or savings, society is bearing the cost.”622   
I have argued elsewhere that we must reject the TBTF “price” of 
universal banks, or we will continue to pay that price during future 
financial crises.623  For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
GLBA’s supporters assured the American people that they would not 
pay such a price, while GLBA’s opponents correctly predicted that 
TBTF bailouts of financial holding companies were virtually certain to 
occur if Congress repealed Glass-Steagall.624   
D.? Congress Enacted CFMA to Provide “Legal Certainty” for 
OTC Derivatives 
 
The final element of the deregulation campaign pursued by large 
financial institutions was to insulate their OTC derivatives activities 
from substantive regulation by the CFTC or SEC.625  Markets for OTC 
derivatives expanded rapidly during the 1990s, and those markets 
became much larger in volume than markets for exchange-traded 
derivatives.626  The largest U.S. banks and securities dealers controlled 
about forty percent of the global OTC derivatives market in 1998.627  
Derivatives activities produced $46 billion of revenues for U.S. bank 
dealers between 1996 and 2000 and accounted for six percent of the 
total revenues of the seven largest bank dealers during that period.628  
However, as described above, the ability of OTC derivatives to escape 
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most types of regulation depended on a tenuous exemption approved 
by the CFTC in 1993.629   
The explosive growth of derivatives markets after the mid-1980s 
was accompanied by numerous warning signs about their risks.630  The 
first danger signal occurred when “portfolio insurance” failed during 
the stock market crash of October 1987.631  Portfolio insurance was a 
derivatives-based hedging strategy that was “designed to protect a 
stock portfolio from dropping below a prespecified floor value.”632  
Portfolio insurance used short sales of exchange-traded stock index 
futures to offset declines in stock prices.633  Portfolio insurance was 
the harbinger of a “brave new world of synthetic instruments [based 
on] dynamic trading strategies.”634   
Portfolio insurance had “all the potential pitfalls of any hedging 
strategy,” because it depended on accurate predictions of future market 
volatility as well as a “liquid” market.635   When the stock market 
began to crash in October 1987, portfolio insurance triggered huge 
volumes of sell orders for stock index futures, and liquidity quickly 
disappeared in the futures markets.636   There was very little buyer 
demand for stock index futures, and the collapse of prices for stock 
index futures helped to drive down prices in the stock market. 637  
“Many observers, including the Brady Commission, concluded that 
portfolio insurance increased the severity of the crash by magnifying 
selling pressures in both the stock market and the futures markets.”638   
During the 1990s, numerous scandals and large trading losses 
connected to OTC derivatives raised even greater public concerns.639  
The Fed’s unexpected decision to increase short-term interest rates in 
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1994 inflicted large losses on a wide variety of institutional investors 
who bought highly-leveraged OTC interest-rate derivatives from bank 
dealers.640  Gibson Greetings, Procter & Gamble, and several other 
companies sued Bankers Trust, alleging that the bank sold them 
complex interest-rate derivatives without disclosing the embedded 
risks.641  Bankers Trust paid more than $250 million to settle those 
lawsuits and to cover civil penalties assessed by the CFTC and SEC.642  
Similarly, Orange County, California sued Merrill Lynch after losing 
$1.6 billion on highly-leveraged interest-rate derivatives purchased 
from Merrill.643  Merrill ultimately paid $470 million to settle civil, 
criminal, and SEC claims related to the Orange County debacle.644  In 
1995, Barings Bank, a prominent U.K. investment bank, failed after 
losing more than $1.4 billion on speculative derivatives trades made 
by Nicholas Leeson, the general manager of Barings’ Singapore 
subsidiary.645   
The foregoing events and other derivatives-related problems 
attracted the attention of policymakers.  The U.S. General Accounting 
Office issued a study warning that OTC derivatives could create 
serious systemic hazards due to the high concentration of OTC 
derivatives exposures within a small group of large banks and 
securities firms, as well as regulatory gaps and weaknesses. 646  
Members of Congress introduced four bills calling for stronger 
regulation of OTC derivatives.647   
In response to this threat of federal regulation, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and its allies sprang into 
action.  ISDA represented the major banks and securities firms that 
were large dealers in OTC derivatives, as well as leading corporate 
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end-users and institutional investors. 648   ISDA’s chairman, Mark 
Brickell, was a JPMC executive.649  Brickell had unlimited faith in the 
wisdom of markets, and he once said, “I am a great believer in the 
self-healing power of markets. . . [m]arkets can correct excess far 
better than any government.  Market discipline is the best form of 
discipline there is.”650   
Brickell and ISDA launched a “tenacious campaign” to block any 
regulation of OTC derivatives, and ISDA’s efforts received strong 
support from the Clinton Administration and Alan Greenspan. 651  
ISDA and other big-bank trade associations argued that regulation of 
OTC derivatives would impose unwarranted costs and stifle 
innovations in risk management by financial institutions.652  Echoing 
ISDA’s themes, Greenspan warned Congress against passing 
legislation that would create “a regulatory regime that is itself 
ineffective and that diminishes the effectiveness of market 
discipline.”653  ISDA blocked all four proposed bills dealing with OTC 
derivatives, thereby achieving “one of the most startling triumphs for a 
Wall Street lobbying campaign in the twentieth century.”654   
Derivatives problems persisted, however.  Dealers and end-users 
suffered significant derivatives-related losses during the Mexican and 
East Asian crises of 1995 and 1997.655   For example, JPMC paid 
almost $600 million to settle lawsuits brought by several Korean banks 
and securities firms after they incurred large losses on OTC currency 
swaps they bought from JPMC.656   
 
 ********************************************* 
  
In 1998, a new regulatory threat appeared.  At a contentious 
meeting in April, CFTC Chairman Brooksley Born received strong 
warnings from Greenspan, Rubin, and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt 
not to proceed with her plan to consider new regulations for OTC 
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derivatives.657   Despite that warning, the CFTC issued a “Concept 
Release” in May 1998. 658   The Concept Release requested public 
comment on whether the CFTC should consider issuing new rules for 
OTC derivatives.659   
The Concept Release stated that the CFTC did not have any 
“preconceived result in mind.”660  However, the CFTC pointed out that 
“the explosive growth in the OTC market in recent years has been 
accompanied by an increase in the number and size of losses even 
among large and sophisticated users” of derivatives.661  Those losses 
and other problems indicated “the need to review the current 
exemptions” for OTC derivatives under the CFTC’s 1993 rule, and to 
consider whether the CFTC should modify those exemptions in order 
“to enhance the fairness, financial integrity, and efficiency of this 
market.”662   
Rubin, Greenspan, and Levitt responded to the Concept Release by 
issuing a “blistering” joint statement.663  The three officials expressed 
“grave concerns” about the Concept Release, and they “seriously 
question[ed] the CFTC’s jurisdiction in this area.” 664   The three 
officials were “very concerned” that the Concept Release would 
“increase the legal uncertainty concerning certain types of OTC 
derivatives.”665   
Despite the strong opposition voiced by Rubin, Greenspan, and 
Levitt, Brooksley Born refused to withdraw the CFTC’s Concept 
Release.666  ISDA and its allies immediately began to lobby Congress 
for legislation that would impose a moratorium on the CFTC’s 
authority to regulate OTC derivatives.667  The Treasury, Fed, and SEC 
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eagerly supported the proposed moratorium.  At a Senate hearing in 
July 1998, Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers declared 
that the “dramatic growth of the [OTC] market in recent years is 
testament not merely to the dynamism of modern financial markets but 
to the benefits that derivatives provide for American businesses.”668  
Summers argued that the CFTC’s Concept Release “cast the shadow 
of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market” and 
created “the risk that the U.S. will see its leadership position in 
derivatives erode” as dealers and end-users moved their derivatives 
activities to foreign countries.669  He maintained that there was “no 
clear evidence of a need for additional regulation of the institutional 
OTC derivatives market,” because “parties to these kinds of 
contract[s] are largely sophisticated financial institutions that would 
appear to be eminently capable of protecting themselves from fraud 
and counterparty insolvencies and . . . are already subject to basic 
safety and soundness regulation under existing banking and securities 
laws.”670   
Greenspan testified at the same Senate hearing, and he fully 
concurred with Summers’ views.671  Greenspan contended that “aside 
from safety and soundness regulation of derivatives dealers under the 
banking or securities laws, regulation of derivatives transactions that 
are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary.” 672   To 
support that claim, Greenspan declared:  
Professional counterparties to privately negotiated 
contracts . . . have demonstrated their ability to protect 
themselves from losses from fraud and counterparty 
insolvencies.  They have managed credit risks quite 
effectively through careful evaluation of counterparties, 
the setting of internal credit limits, and judicious use of 
netting and collateral agreements.  In particular, they 
have insisted that dealers have financial strength 
sufficient to warrant a credit rating of A or higher.673 
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Two months later, the crisis surrounding Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) revealed that Summers’ and Greenspan’s faith 
in the effectiveness of market discipline for OTC derivatives was 
completely unfounded. 674   LTCM, a prominent hedge fund, was 
founded in 1994 by “a dazzling array of partners,” including Nobel 
Prize laureates Myron Scholes and Robert Merton.675  Together with 
Fischer Black, Scholes and Merton pioneered “the modern option 
pricing and risk management theories” that underlay much of the OTC 
derivatives market.676  LTCM's other founders included former Fed 
vice chairman David Mullins and John Meriweather, the leader of 
Salomon Brothers’ “legendary” bond-trading team during the 
1980s.677  Meriweather recruited several members of that team to join 
him at LTCM.678   
LTCM produced large profits between 1994 and 1997 by using 
highly-leveraged, speculative trading strategies that relied heavily on 
OTC derivatives. 679   LTCM’s profits “caused the fund's investors, 
lenders, and counterparties to ask few questions about the risks 
inherent in its capital position and trading strategy.”680  In early 1998, 
LTCM held about $5 billion in equity capital, while “its huge 
investment portfolio included $125 billion of securities, including 
large amounts of debt securities borrowed from commercial and 
investment banks under repurchase agreements and derivatives having 
aggregate notional values of $1.25 trillion.”681   
LTCM’s “primary strategy” during 1998 was to make 
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“‘convergence-arbitrage’ trades, in which it sought to take advantage 
of . . . pricing discrepancies between higher-risk, private-sector debt 
securities and lower-risk government bonds in both domestic and 
overseas markets.”682  LTCM expected that global market conditions 
would improve in 1998, due to the positive effects of rescue programs 
organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major 
industrial nations for East Asian countries that encountered severe 
difficulties in 1997.683  LTCM believed that credit spreads between 
risky and “safe” bonds would narrow in 1998, and the fund also 
“aggressively sold equity options because it believed that volatility in 
the equity markets would decline.”684  The fund's traders based their 
trading positions on “value at risk” (VAR) models derived from 
Scholes’ and Merton’s theoretical work.685  LTCM’s models indicated 
that disruptive events like a sovereign bond default or a stock market 
crash were very unlikely to occur in 1998.686   
In August 1998, Russia devalued the ruble and defaulted on debt 
owed to foreign creditors.687  The IMF did not intervene with a rescue 
package, as many market participants expected. 688   Russia’s 
devaluation and debt default “triggered a global ‘flight to quality’ as 
investors frantically sought to buy ‘safe’ and highly liquid securities 
(especially U.S. treasury bonds) while unloading their positions in 
illiquid, high-risk securities or related derivatives.  Yield spreads 
between high-risk and low-risk debt securities widened dramatically, 
and the volatility of equity markets soared.”689  Those events dealt “a 
fatal blow to LTCM’s ‘convergence’ strategy” and doomed the 
fund.690  Scholes later admitted that “the VAR models used by LTCM 
and other major financial institutions had failed to anticipate the 
‘liquidity risk’ that suddenly appeared in August 1998.”691   
By mid-September, LTCM had lost $4.4 billion of its capital and 
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688 Id.  
689 Id. at 348. 
690 Id. 
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appealed to the Fed for help.692  The Fed concluded that “a failure by 
LTCM to fulfill its derivatives contracts and securities repurchase 
agreements could paralyze global financial markets” by setting off a 
“chain reaction of failures among large [derivatives] dealers” as well 
as panicked, “fire-sale” liquidations of securities and other financial 
assets connected to OTC derivatives. 693   Federal regulators also 
determined that a number of major banks and securities firms had 
engaged in “herd behavior” by attempting to copy LTCM’s trades, and 
those institutions were exposed to the same types of losses that 
crippled LTCM. 694   Regulators feared that LTCM’s failure could 
create a systemic crisis in global financial markets and could threaten 
the survival of large banks and securities firms.695   
To forestall such a crisis, the Fed took the extraordinary action of 
cutting short-term interest rates three times in seven weeks.696  The 
Fed also arranged an emergency rescue of LTCM by fourteen of the 
largest U.S. banks and securities firms.697  The rescue group injected 
$3.6 billion of new capital into LTCM in return for  ninety percent of 
the fund’s equity.698  The LTCM debacle confirmed “prior warnings 
that the rapid growth of OTC derivatives would aggravate systemic 
risk in the financial markets.”699  The LTCM crisis also demonstrated 
that neither regulators nor market participants understood the location, 
magnitude, or potential correlations of LTCM’s risk exposures in OTC 
derivatives.700  The near collapse of AIG in 2008 revealed the same 
type of risk assessment failures by regulators and market 
participants.701 
The 1998 financial crisis inflicted severe losses on Citigroup, 
BofA, Bankers Trust, and a number of other domestic and foreign 
financial conglomerates.702  Given the weakened condition of large 
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financial institutions and the highly-stressed circumstances in many 
financial markets, the Fed felt obliged to take extraordinary measures 
to prevent the crisis from becoming a full-fledged global financial 
panic.703   
In my view, the 1998 crisis should be viewed as a precursor and 
dress rehearsal for the global financial crisis of 2007–09.  However, 
market participants and policymakers failed to apply the lessons they 
should have learned from the 1998 crisis, and they did not build 
adequate defenses to deal with the next decade’s crisis.  A 2011 study 
determined that large banks and securities firms that suffered the 
greatest declines in stock market value during the 1998 crisis also 
recorded the worst stock market performances in 2007 and 2008.704  
Thus, large financial institutions that incurred severe losses in 1998 
“d[id] not appear to subsequently alter the[ir] business model or to 
become more cautious regarding their risk culture” prior to the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007.705  The extraordinary 
measures that the Fed took in 1998 to stabilize financial markets and 
to help rescue LTCM may have caused large banks and securities 
firms to believe that they did not need to change their business models 
or risk profiles.706  They may well have expected that the Fed would 
intervene to protect major financial firms during any similar future 
crisis.707   
Similarly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission determined 
that the 1998 financial crisis (i) did not persuade large financial 
institutions to make any significant changes in the high-risk strategies 
that caused them to incur severe losses in 1998, and (ii) did not cause 
financial regulators to insist on such changes by the institutions they 
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supervised.708  A reasonable observer might well conclude that the 
1998 crisis was the dead canary in the mine, or the tree falling in the 
forest, that advocates of “financial modernization” were determined 
neither to see nor hear.   
 
 ********************************************* 
  
Someone who knew nothing about the politics of OTC derivatives 
might reasonably assume that the LTCM debacle would have caused 
the Clinton Administration and Congress to join with Brooksley Born 
in crafting new regulations to control the risks of OTC derivatives.  Of 
course, nothing like that happened.  Only a few policymakers publicly 
agreed with Born that LTCM’s collapse demonstrated the need for 
new rules governing OTC derivatives. 709   Opponents of stronger 
regulation dismissed any connection between LTCM’s failure and 
either (i) LTCM’s enormous positions in OTC derivatives or (ii) the 
absence of regulation for OTC derivatives.710  The derivatives lobby 
“besieged Congress with appeals” to block the CFTC from adopting 
any new regulations for OTC derivatives, and Congress quickly 
imposed a temporary moratorium on such measures.711      
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711 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N (2011), supra note 12, at 47–48; MCLEAN 
& NOCERA, supra note 128, at 107–08; Stout, supra note 16, at 20–21; Opening 
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 Congress requested reports on the LTCM crisis and the regulation 
of OTC derivatives from the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets (PWGFM or the Working Group).712  The Working Group 
included the heads of the Treasury, Fed, SEC, and CFTC.713  Before 
the Working Group issued its reports, Greenspan staked out his 
position in a speech he presented to a derivatives trade group in March 
1999.714   In that speech, Greenspan declared that OTC derivatives 
represented “[b]y far the most significant development in finance 
during the past decade.” 715   He praised OTC derivatives for 
“enhanc[ing] the process of wealth creation” by creating the “ability to 
differentiate risk and allocate it to those investors most able and 
willing to take it.”716  He also lauded “the profitability of derivative 
products” for boosting the earnings of major banks and for 
contributing to “the significant gain in the overall finance industry’s 
share of American corporate output during the past decade.”717 
Greenspan acknowledged that losses from derivatives “rose to 
record levels in the third quarter of 1998.”718  However, he argued, 
“[d]erivative instruments were bystanders [and] were scarcely the 
major players” during the 1998 crisis.719  He also contended that “there 
are fundamental strengths in [the derivatives] markets,” and “there has 
not been a significant downturn in the economy overall that has tested 
the resilience of derivatives markets.”720  Greenspan’s speech never 
specifically mentioned either LTCM or the emergency rescue of 
LTCM arranged by the Fed.721   
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Given the substance and tone of Greenspan’s speech, it is not 
surprising that both of the Working Group’s reports minimized the 
role played by derivatives in LTCM’s failure, and the second report 
recommended a sweeping deregulation of OTC derivatives.722  The 
Working Group’s first report, issued in April 1999, assigned primary 
blame for LTCM’s “near collapse” to its “excessive leverage,” and the 
report described LTCM’s massive positions in OTC and exchange-
graded derivatives only in general terms, with relatively few details.723  
The report focused mainly on LTCM’s “opaqueness and low degree of 
external monitoring,” which resulted from (i) the “minimal scrutiny” 
of LTCM’s risk profile and trading strategies by investors, creditors, 
and counterparties, and (ii) the “minimal information” that LTCM 
provided to those parties.724   
The Working Group determined that “none of [LTCM’s] investors, 
creditors, or counterparties provided an effective check on its overall 
activities.”725  The report also concluded that “[t]he risk management 
weaknesses revealed by the LTCM episode were not unique to 
LTCM” and also occurred, “albeit to a lesser degree, in . . . investment 
and commercial banks.”726  Thus, the Working Group’s first report 
revealed that market discipline failed to restrain excessive risk-taking 
by LTCM and also failed to protect leading banks and securities from 
suffering heavy losses.727  Nevertheless, the Working Group declared 
that market discipline should remain the “primary mechanism that 
regulates risk-taking by firms in a market economy.” 728   In the 
Working Group's view, “market discipline of risk-taking is the rule 
and government regulation is the exception. . . . Any resort to 
government regulation should have a clear purpose and should be 
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carefully evaluated in order to avoid unintended outcomes.”729   
The Working Group's first report acknowledged that LTCM “held 
very substantial OTC derivatives positions related to reference assets 
that were not actively traded” and for which there “was little liquidity  
. . . even under normal circumstances.”730  The report also pointed out 
that LTCM’s counterparties would have faced significant losses if 
LTCM had defaulted on OTC derivatives that were “illiquid” and 
“difficult to hedge or liquidate.” 731   However, the report did not 
recommend any new substantive rules to address the risks created by 
high concentrations of illiquid OTC derivatives held by either dealers 
or end-users.732   
The Working Group’s strong ideological commitment to market 
discipline –– in the face of abundant evidence showing that such 
discipline failed in 1998 –– helps to explain why its first report did not 
recommend any new substantive controls for OTC derivatives.  
Instead, the report recommended measures to “constrain excessive 
leverage” through enhanced disclosures and improved risk 
management practices. 733   In keeping with the Working Group’s 
distaste for substantive regulation, the report rejected any “direct 
constraints on leverage” and instead called for better “credit-risk 
management.”734    
The Working Group’s second report, issued in November 1999, 
urged Congress to approve a comprehensive deregulation of OTC 
derivatives.735  In cover letters addressed to congressional leaders, the 
Working Group lauded the benefits of OTC derivatives and warned 
that the dominant position of U.S. derivatives dealers would be 
threatened unless Congress removed the “cloud of legal uncertainty” 
that surrounded OTC derivatives: 
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One of the most dramatic changes in the world of 
finance during the past fifteen years has been the 
extraordinary development of the markets for financial 
derivatives.  Over-the-counter derivatives have 
transformed the world of finance, increasing the range 
of financial products available to corporations and 
investors and fostering more precise ways of 
understanding, quantifying, and managing risk . . .  
A cloud of legal uncertainty has hung over the OTC 
derivatives markets in the United States in recent years, 
which, if not addressed, could discourage innovation 
and growth in these important markets and damage 
U.S. leadership in these arenas by driving transactions 
off-shore.736   
The Working Group called on Congress to exclude OTC 
derivatives between “sophisticated counterparties” from regulation by 
the CFTC under the CEA, whether the transactions were completed 
through privately-negotiated transactions or electronic trading systems 
or other clearing systems. 737   The report also recommended 
exemptions from CFTC regulation for most “hybrid instruments,” 
including deposits or securities that contained features similar to 
swaps, forwards, options, or futures.738  The Working Group declared 
that the proposed exemptions were essential to remove “legal 
uncertainty” about OTC derivatives and to “provide a permanent 
clarification of the legal status of these instruments.”739   
Echoing arguments previously made by Greenspan and Summers, 
the Working Group’s second report contended that “sophisticated 
counterparties” in OTC derivatives transactions did not need 
regulatory protection because most dealers were already subject to 
adequate supervision by bank regulators, the SEC, or the CFTC.740  
The report also maintained that “[m]ost OTC derivatives are not 
susceptible to manipulation” because their payoffs were based on an 
underlying “rate or price determined by a separate, highly liquid 
market.”741  The report further claimed that derivatives did not affect 
prices in other markets because “prices established in OTC derivatives 
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transactions do not serve a significant price discovery function.”742  
The Working Group's conclusions that OTC derivatives did not need 
to be regulated, could not be used for manipulative purposes, and 
would not affect prices in related markets proved to be very grave 
miscalculations.   
Like its first report, the Working Group's second report stated that 
regulators should rely on “private counterparty discipline” as the 
“primary mechanism” for ensuring that OTC derivatives dealers did 
not create “systemic risk.”743  Despite the first report's conclusion that 
market discipline failed to restrain highly-leveraged and speculative 
risk-taking by LTCM, the second report asserted that “private 
counterparty credit risk management has been employed effectively by 
both regulated and unregulated dealers of OTC derivatives, and the 
tools required by federal regulators [to supplement market discipline] 
already exist.” 744   Except for two brief references, the Working 
Group's second report did not mention LTCM and did not contain any 
discussion of lessons learned from the LTCM crisis.745  It appeared 
that members of the Working Group had already expunged the LTCM 
fiasco from their collective memories. 
 
 ********************************************* 
 
Armed with the support provided by the Working Group's second 
report, the derivatives industry and its political allies mounted a 
successful campaign to enact CFMA.746  The only significant question 
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was how broad the scope of CFMA’s deregulation should be.  Senator 
Phil Gramm was not satisfied with the bills that emerged from House 
and Senate committees.747  Those bills excluded OTC derivatives from 
regulation by the CFTC, but Gramm was greatly concerned that the 
SEC might attempt to regulate OTC derivatives.748  Gramm put an 
extended hold on the legislation until congressional leaders and the 
Clinton Administration agreed on a final bill that was acceptable to 
him.749  Under CFMA’s final version, OTC derivatives entered into by 
financial institutions, corporate end-users, institutional investors, or 
wealthy individuals were excluded from all substantive regulation by 
either the CFTC or SEC. 750   In addition, OTC derivatives were 
protected from regulation under state laws.751  The CFTC and SEC 
retained only a very limited authority to bring enforcement actions for 
fraud or manipulation on a case-by-case basis.752   
The Working Group strongly endorsed the final version of CFMA.  
The Working Group praised CFMA for preserving the “competitive 
position” of the United States in OTC derivatives markets, and for 
“providing legal certainty and promoting innovation, transparency and 
efficiency in our financial markets.”753   
Senator Gramm agreed that CFMA would provide “legal 
certainty” for OTC derivatives. 754   In addition, he argued, CFMA 
“completes the work of [GLBA]” and “protects financial institutions 
from over-regulation.”755  Gramm declared that GLBA and CFMA had 
dismantled the post-New Deal system of financial regulation and 
established a new regime of comprehensive deregulation, which would 
enable U.S. financial institutions to dominate global financial markets: 
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Taken together with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the 
work of this Congress will be seen as a watershed, 
where we turned away from the outmoded Depression-
era approach to financial regulation and adopted a 
framework that will position our financial services 
industries to be world leaders into the new century.756 
IV.?CONCLUSION 
 
Riegle-Neal, GLBA and CFMA were highly consequential laws.  
Those three laws allowed large banks to become much bigger and 
more complex, and to undertake a much wider array of high-risk 
activities.  They transformed the U.S. financial industry from a 
decentralized system of independent financial sectors, with specialized 
financial institutions, into a highly consolidated industry dominated by 
large financial conglomerates.  The big-bank lobby and its political 
allies secured passage of Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA through a 
carefully-planned campaign, and not by accident.  All three laws 
reflected an ideology of comprehensive deregulation, and they 
provided a blueprint for light-touch supervision based on a declared 
faith in the wisdom and self-healing properties of untrammeled 
financial markets.   
The prevailing ideology of deregulation was clearly articulated in 
the 1991 Treasury report as well as public interviews, speeches, and 
testimony by policymakers like Phil Gramm, Alan Greenspan, Robert 
Rubin, and Lawrence Summers, and financial industry leaders like 
Walter Wriston and Sandy Weill.  The ideology of deregulation was 
not consistent, and it was arguably disingenuous.  Policymakers and 
industry leaders recognized that large financial conglomerates were 
likely to benefit from (i) transfers of federal safety-net subsidies from 
conglomerate-owned banks to their securities and insurance affiliates, 
and (ii) the TBTF subsidy.  However, whenever Congress or federal 
regulators faced a choice between limiting the spread of public 
subsidies or granting more profit-making opportunities to big banks 
and Wall Street, the big banks and Wall Street almost always 
prevailed.757    
The ideology of deregulation clearly served the interests of large 
financial institutions, and their power and influence grew in response 
to all three statutes.  Riegle-Neal enabled the largest banks to expand 
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throughout the nation, thereby increasing their political advantage over 
smaller banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.758  Major 
securities firms and insurance companies joined the campaign to enact 
GLBA when they realized they could not prevent big banks from 
extending their reach into securities and insurance markets.  All three 
financial sectors supported CFMA because it allowed the largest 
financial institutions to conduct their OTC derivatives businesses free 
of any substantive regulation.  The enactment of GLBA and CFMA in 
consecutive years showed just how powerful the emerging financial 
conglomerates had become.759 
I disagree with scholars who contend that GLBA and CFMA did 
not play important roles in promoting the reckless credit boom that led 
to the financial crisis.  Those analysts maintain that GLBA and CFMA 
merely ratified what federal regulators and courts had already done in 
permitting large financial institutions to expand the scope of their 
financial activities before 1999.760  As discussed above in Part II.B, 
regulators and courts issued rulings during the 1980s and 1990s that 
opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall’s and BHCA’s structural barriers 
and granted exemptions from regulation for OTC derivatives. 761  
However, those loopholes and exemptions rested on highly contestable 
legal interpretations and could have been reversed by either regulators 
or the courts.  In addition, the drafters of the 1991 Treasury plan and 
advocates for GLBA and CFMA argued that the loopholes and 
exemptions were incomplete, burdensome, inefficient, and 
unacceptable.762   
The proponents of GLBA and CFMA declared that both statutes 
were urgently needed to provide “legal certainty” for a deregulated 
regime of universal banking that could (i) incorporate all types of 
financial activities within a “one-stop shopping” platform, and (ii) 
offer a full range of OTC derivatives without any substantive 
regulation by the CFTC or SEC.763  It is highly unlikely that the largest 
financial institutions and their trade associations would have pursued a 
twenty-year legislative campaign, involving hundreds of millions of 
dollars in lobbying expenses and political campaign contributions, if 
they had viewed GLBA and CFMA as insignificant laws.  The 
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evidence clearly points to the contrary conclusion: namely, that big 
banks and Wall Street firms viewed GLBA and CFMA as essential 
components of their strategy to build giant financial conglomerates 
that could dominate domestic and global financial markets by 
exploiting their TBTF status and associated public subsidies.764   
One very tangible way to confirm the significance of GLBA and 
CFMA is to see how quickly the financial industry changed in 
response to those statutes.  GLBA expanded the previously-authorized 
securities and insurance activities of banking organizations by 
allowing banks to establish full-scale affiliations with securities firms 
and insurance companies.765  GLBA’s first major dividend for big 
banks was to validate Citigroup’s universal banking strategy. 766  
Without GLBA, Citigroup would have been forced to divest major 
segments of its nonbanking activities, and other banks could not have 
copied Citigroup’s business model.  GLBA created a second 
immediate benefit for big banks by permitting them to convert their 
limited Section 20 securities subsidiaries into full-service securities 
broker-dealers with many fewer operational constraints.767   A year 
after GLBA’s enactment, a federal regulator observed, “Loopholes 
cost money . . . A top bank told me [GLBA] was a major boost to their 
bottom line.”768 
GLBA’s endorsement for Citigroup’s universal banking model 
quickly led to the creation of similar financial conglomerates.  In 
2000, Credit Suisse and UBS acquired large U.S. securities firms 
(Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and Paine Webber), and Chase merged 
with JPMC to form a commercial and investment banking giant.769  
Meanwhile, Deutsche Bank completed its acquisition of Bankers Trust 
(a U.S. bank with significant investment banking activities) in 1999.770   
The top securities firms responded to the emergence of universal 
banks with their own consolidation and diversification strategies.  
Morgan Stanley merged with Dean Witter in 1997, while the four 
other major securities firms –– Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, 
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Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns –– also grew rapidly in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.771  By 2004, the “Big Five” securities firms 
held combined assets of $2.5 trillion, compared with $4.7 trillion of 
assets held by the five largest U.S. banks.772   
The four largest securities firms (all except Bear Stearns) 
complemented their securities activities with deposit-taking and 
lending by acquiring FDIC-insured thrifts and industrial banks 
(institutions that were not subject to BHCA’s ownership 
restrictions).773  Deposit-taking and lending allowed securities firms to 
obtain low-cost, government-subsidized funding and to compete more 
directly with large banks by providing credit to consumers and 
businesses.  By 2006, the four largest securities firms had become “de 
facto universal banks.”774  Meanwhile, CFMA enabled leading banks 
and securities firms to deal in an extensive array of OTC derivatives, 
including CDS and synthetic CDOs.775   
As I have shown in previous work, a group of eighteen domestic 
and foreign financial conglomerates “dominated global and U.S. 
markets for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured 
financial products, and OTC derivatives” by 2007. 776   That group 
(which I have called the “big eighteen”) included the four largest U.S. 
banks (BofA, Citigroup, JPMC, and Wachovia), the “Big Five” U.S. 
securities firms, the largest U.S. insurer (AIG), and eight foreign 
universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, HSBC, RBS, Société Générale, and UBS). 777   The “big 
eighteen” became the “epicenter” of the global financial crisis, as they 
accounted for three-fifths of the $1.5 trillion of worldwide losses 
recorded by financial institutions from mid-2007 through the spring of 
2010. 778   Of the “big eighteen,” only Lehman failed outright, but 
twelve other institutions received massive amounts of financial 
assistance from government authorities in the United States, United 
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Kingdom (UK), and European Union (EU).779   
The ten American members of the “big eighteen” could never have 
achieved their size and scope in 2007 without the enactment of at least 
one of the three statutes (Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and CFMA) discussed 
in this article.  Similarly, the eight foreign universal banks greatly 
expanded their size and scope in the UK, EU, and the United States in 
response to deregulation that occurred in all three regions.780  As Barry 
Eichengreen has observed, “[t]he result of [Riegle-Neal, GLBA, and 
CFMA] was a massive increase in the size, complexity, and leverage 
of US financial institutions. . . . [¶] And what was true of banks in the 
United States was similarly true of banks elsewhere, notably in 
Europe.”781   
A second way to confirm the very significant impact of GLBA and 
CFMA is to consider the explosive growth that occurred in markets for 
“shadow bank deposits,” securitization, and OTC derivatives after 
2000.  The volume of outstanding MMMFs increased from $1.8 
trillion in 2000 to $3.8 trillion in 2007, and the commercial paper 
market grew from $1.3 trillion to $2 trillion during the same period.782  
Outstanding repos at securities broker-dealers (including affiliates of 
banks) rose from $2.5 trillion to $3.5 trillion between 2002 and 2007, 
while outstanding structured-finance securities issued in private-label 
securitizations expanded from $1.6 trillion to $5 trillion between 2001 
and 2006.783  Most dramatically, the aggregate notional values of OTC 
derivatives in global markets exploded from $95 trillion in 2000 to 
$673 trillion in mid-2008, with U.S. financial institutions accounting 
for about two-fifths of that market.784  It seems highly improbable that 
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such dramatic growth could have occurred in all of those markets 
without the far-reaching deregulation authorized by GLBA and 
CFMA.785   
John Reed and Sandy Weill, who co-founded Citigroup, 
subsequently renounced their brainchild.786  Reed apologized in 2009 
for his role in creating Citigroup and said that Congress made a 
mistake when it repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.787  In a 2013 
interview, Reed explained that “the greatest problem [in Citigroup] 
was of clashing cultures” between traders and commercial bankers.788  
As the trading culture expanded, it was “infectious” and became the 
“more dominant” ethos within Citigroup. 789   The trading culture 
“made risk harder to control,” and the complexity of Citigroup made it 
“harder to manage.” 790   Paul Volcker agreed with Reed that the 
“cleavage between the culture on the investment banking side of the 
house and the traditional lending side of the house” was a “major 
worry” caused by universal banks.791   
In a 2010 interview, Sandy Weill defended his role as the 
“Shatterer of Glass-Steagall.”792  However, his views had changed two 
years later.793  During a CNBC interview in 2012, Weill declared that 
policymakers should “split up investment banking from banking, have 
banks be deposit takers, have banks make commercial loans and real 
estate loans, have banks do something that‘s not going to risk the 
taxpayer dollars, that‘s not too big to fail.”794  He recommended that 
universal banks should be “broken up so that the taxpayer will never 
be at risk, the depositors won‘t be at risk, the leverage of the banks 
will be something reasonable,” and so that independent investment 
banks could “make some mistakes” without causing systemic crises.795   
Charles Mitchell, who built the first big universal bank at National 
City (Citigroup’s predecessor) during the 1920s, 796  subsequently 
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decided that Glass-Steagall served the public interest by separating 
commercial banks from securities firms.  In testimony before the 
Federal Monopoly Committee in December 1939, Mitchell praised 
Glass-Steagall as a “great ‘step’ of progress,” even though he had 
opposed its enactment in 1933.797  Mitchell told the Committee, “I am 
convinced today that if we had gone along with the development of the 
securities affiliates [of commercial banks] it would have resulted in [a] 
monopoly.”798   
The recantations of Reed, Weill, and Mitchell highlight a number 
of reasons for restoring structural barriers similar to Glass-Steagall and 
the pre-1999 BHCA.  Separating banks from the capital markets 
would end the culture clash between banking and trading, and it would 
also eliminate conflicts of interest that make it impossible for universal 
banks to act as impartial allocators of credit and unbiased providers of 
investment advice.  Separation would stop financial conglomerates 
from extending their safety-net subsidies and TBTF guarantees into 
the capital markets, thereby distorting prices and promoting excessive 
risk-taking in those markets.  Restoring Glass-Steagall and the pre-
1999 BHCA would prevent financial conglomerates from dominating 
many sectors of our financial markets by exploiting their public 
subsidies and leveraging their unfair cost-of-funding advantages.  
Whenever we hear policymakers and financial industry leaders 
proclaiming their devotion to “free” financial markets and “market 
discipline,” we must remember that our post-GLBA financial system 
seriously undermines those principles.799   
This article does not include detailed recommendations for 
proposed reforms to address the problems created by Riegle-Neal, 
GLBA, and CFMA.  I have discussed possible reforms in previous 
work, 800  and I plan to develop a more complete set of potential 
reforms in future work.  There are at least two approaches that a new 
regime of structural separation could adopt.  The first, which I call 
“external Glass-Steagall,” would require a complete separation 
between banks and the capital markets, similar to the original Glass-
Steagall Act.  The first approach would break up existing financial 
conglomerates and prevent the formation of new ones.   
The second approach, which I call “internal Glass-Steagall,” would 
require financial conglomerates to structure their subsidiary banks as 
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FDIC-insured “narrow banks,” which would be strictly separated from 
their nonbank affiliates.  Among other restrictions, conglomerate-
owned banks could not make any loans or other transfers of funds to 
their nonbank affiliates, except for the payment of lawful dividends to 
their parent holding companies. 801   An “internal Glass-Steagall” 
approach would not force financial conglomerates to break up, but it 
would seek to prevent conglomerate-owned banks from transferring 
their federal safety-net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates.  This 
approach is similar to “ring-fencing” legislation that the UK adopted 
after the financial crisis.802   An "internal Glass-Steagall" approach 
would raise important questions regarding the ability and willingness 
of regulators to establish and enforce strong firewalls that would be 
effective in preventing the spread of public subsidies from 
conglomerate-owned banks to their nonbank affiliates.   
At a minimum, as I will discuss in future work, a restoration of 
Glass-Steagall-style structural reforms must accomplish two goals.  
First, in order to shrink the shadow banking system and reduce the 
threat of creditor “runs” in that system, reforms must prohibit 
nonbanks from offering deposit substitutes: namely, debt instruments 
with very short terms that are payable at par, such as short-term repos 
and MMMFs with fixed NAVs of one dollar per share.803  Second, 
reforms must establish a strict separation between FDIC-insured banks 
and the capital markets, based on either an “external” or “internal” 
Glass-Steagall approach.  Those reforms must include a prohibition 
that would bar FDIC-insured banks from entering into derivatives 
except for those that provide bona fide hedges against risk exposures 
arising out of traditional banking activities. 804   Without such a 
prohibition, banks would be able to circumvent any structural reforms 
by using derivatives to create synthetic substitutes for securities, 
futures, options, and insurance (as shown above in Part II.B.3). 
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